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ECAUSE OF an unfortunate coincidence of labels, price discrimina-
tion in law is often confused with price discrimination in eco-
nomics. Legislation against price discrimination is sometimes
thought to regulate the practice of what may be called economic dis-
crimination.1
The confusion is unfortunate. Since economic discrimination is gen-
erally thought to contribute to misallocation of resources in the economy
and to constitute a perquisite of economic power enjoyed at the expense
of the public, it is natural to suppose that, whatever may be said about
anti-discrimination legislation, one of its merits is that it tends to reduce
the incidence of an undesirable economic phenomenon. In discussions
of the Robinson-Patman Act, for example, the felt need for maintaining
some restrictions on economic discrimination tends to dampen demands
for outright repeal.
The purpose of the inquiry undertaken here is simple. It is to deter-
mine whether anti-discrimination legislation operates to restrict eco-
nomic discrimination. If it should be the case that anti-discrimination
' The author wishes to thank Professor Paul W. MacAvoy for his many helpful
comments and suggestions based on the reading of an early draft of this article.
- Associate Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
1 To avoid confusion between the legal concept and the economic phenomenon
of price discrimination, the latter will from time to time be referred to herein as
economic discrimination. Alternative references to price discrimination and rate
discrimination are not meant to suggest any inherent economic difference but rather
constitute simply a stylistic concession to the widespread convention of using the
former to refer to economic discrimination in the sale of goods and the latter to
economic discrimination in the sale of transportation and electric power.
I
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
legislation has little to do with economic discrimination, or if indeed
that such legislation tended to encourage or even require economic dis-
crimination, then the merits of such legislation could be more simply
assessed. Such legislation could then be evaluated on the basis of what-
ever social and political values it might be thought to reflect. Professor
Corwin Edwards, for example, views the Robinson-Patman Act as a
"political" statute embodying the "democratic ideal" that "so far as
private persons have the power to affect substantially the rights and op-
portunities of their fellows ... they [as well as "persons exercising politi-
cal and judicial authority"] have a duty to treat their fellows equally.' 2
Some supporters have asserted that the Robinson-Patman Act is the legis-
lative embodiment of a "constitutional freedom-equality of oppor-
tunity"3 while the "Magna Carta" metaphor has seemed compelling to
others.4 Representative Patman has suggested that an appropriate refer-
ence is to the "Golden Rule." 5
In undertaking this inquiry no attempt shall be made to review all
the state and federal statutes which in one form or another purport to
proscribe discrimination in prices and rates. Enlightening as such a re-
view might prove in revealing the pervasive attraction of such measures
for legislators, it would be an unwieldy task. On the other hand, it
would be a mistake to limit attention to a single statute where the
political factors which led to the legislation or its particular mode of
enforcement might be considered as an explanation of any divergence
2 EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAv 1 (1959).
3 PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 197 (1963), sets out a
statement made Dec. 16, 1953 to the Attorney General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws by the National Association of Retail Grocers, the National As-
sociation of Retail Druggists, the National Association of Independent Tire Dealers,
Inc., the National Congress of Petroleum Retailers, Inc., the United Fresh Fruit and
Vegetable Association, the National Food Brokers Association, the National Candy
Wholesalers Association, Inc. and the United States Wholesale Grocers' Association,
Inc.: "Constitutional freedom-equality of opportunity--of the people to engage in
trade or business, is the essential concern of the national antitrust policy .... "
4 Patman quotes a witness for the National Farmers Union saying: "The Robinson-
Patman Act has been referred to as the Magna Carta of small business. We consider
it the Magna Carta of agriculture also." Id. at 200.
5 "This bill has the opposition of all cheaters, chiselers, bribe takers, bribe givers,
and the greedy who seek monopolistic powers which would destroy opportunity for
all young people and which would eventually cause Government ownership, as the
people of this country will not tolerate private monopoly.
"The bill has the support of those who believe that competition is the life of trade;
that the policy of live and let live is a good one; that it is one of the first duties of
Government to protect the weak against the strong and prevent men from injuring
one another; that greed should be restrained and the Golden Rule practiced." 80
CONG. REc. 3447 (1936), set out in ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT 14 (1962).
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between the effects of the legislation and the elimination of economic
discrimination. Three statutory schemes with different political and
social origins will therefore be studied; the Robinson-Patman Act, the
Interstate Commerce Act's regulation of railroads6 and state regulation
of electric utilities. Two are federal schemes and one is the varying
product of the many state legislatures. One is applicable in so-called
"unregulated" industries and two in "regulated" industries. 7
An examination of different modes of enforcement is useful because,
as we shall see, the effect of an anti-discrimination statute upon the
practice of economic discrimination depends at least as much upon the
enforcement agency's interpretation of its role as it does upon the
statutory language. Such agencies, in the treatment of legislation pri-
marily designed to eliminate economic discrimination, may interpret it,
for example, as intended to insure equal treatment and preserve eco-
nomic opportunitys Such a view may be thought of as an "equal op-
portunity" interpretation. On the other hand, and this may particularly
be the case where the prohibition is part of a more comprehensive regu-
latory scheme, the agencies concerned may apply the proscription only
to situations in which purchasers who are to the common mind in-
disputably equals are treated unequally. Such a restrictive view of the
prohibition, which may be called a "promotional" interpretation, may
be adopted in order to make the prohibition consistent with the regula-
tory agency's general policy of promoting consumption of the product
or service under regulation.
A comparison of these three divergent approaches to a single phe-
nomenon should also be useful in a number of collateral inquiries. It
6 An analysis of the Interstate Commerce Act seems particularly appropriate in any
review of anti-discrimination legislation. We have it on the highest judicial authority
that the principal purpose of the act was to eliminate discrimination. See Louisville
& N. R.R. v. United States, 262 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1931); New York v. United States, 331
U.S. 284, 296 (1947).
7 Every industry is regulated to a greater or lesser degree. Indeed, it would be dif-
ficult to think of an industry where there were not some limitations affecting price or
entry-whether, for example, by way of the antitrust laws, fair trade or usury laws
or licensing, disclosure, labeling and safety requirements. Nevertheless, it is conven-
tional to distinguish between "regulated" and "unregulated" industries. In general,
the former category includes industries where there is comprehensive affirmative regu-
lation, particularly of price levels and structure, whereas the latter category refers to
regulation of a less comprehensive nature.
8 The Senate Judiciary Committee announced as its "guiding ideal": "the preserva-
tion of equal opportunity to all usefully employed in the service of distribution com-
portably with their ability and equipment to serve the producing and consuming
public with real efficiency, and the preservation to that public of its freedom from
threat of monopoly or oppression in obtaining its needs and disposing of its products."
S. RaP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936), set out in RowE, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 20.
1963]
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
should reveal something about the nature of economic discrimination
and the problems which necessarily arise in attempting to eliminate it. It
should tell us something about the difference in method between com-
prehensive regulation of certain "regulated" industries by independent
regulatory commissions, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission
and state utility commissions, as contrasted with the more limited regu-
lation of "unregulated" industries by agencies such as the Federal Trade
Commission. More particularly, it may be possible to determine to what
extent differences in the overall system of regulation tend to produce
different substantive rules governing discrimination.
The inquiry in this paper will be conducted in several stages. First, the
nature of economic discrimination will be examined with a view to
identifying its indispensable elements. The three statutory schemes in
question will then be reviewed in preparation for a comparative analysis
of the manner in which three potentially discriminatory practices-
quantity discounts, classification of customers and geographical dif-
ferentials-are regulated under each of the three statutory, schemes. The
role of the meeting competition defense in any scheme for regulating
discrimination will also be considered. Finally, a comparison of the pur-
pose and method in enforcement of the three statutory schemes will be
undertaken.
I. THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION
Before proceeding to an analysis of statutes purporting to regulate
economic discrimination, it would be useful to arrive at a working
definition of the economic phenomenon supposedly under regulation.
Rather than arbitrarily setting forth a definition of economic discrimi-
nation and then examining what behavior falls within and without that
definition, it would seem preferable, at least for a common-law lawyer,
to proceed in a somewhat more inductive fashion.9 A dear case of eco-
nomic discrimination will be examined in detail in order to arrive at a
general rule for determining what other pricing policies should also
constitute economic discrimination.
If a seller sells a single product to different purchasers at different
prices (all units having been produced and distributed by him at the
same cost), it appears to be generally conceded that the seller has en-
gaged in economic discrimination. The next issue is whether the seller
has also engaged in economic discrimination where the price to different
purchasers for the same product is the same but the seller's costs are
different. To determine whether the latter situation involves economic
9 See generally LEVi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948).
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discrimination, we must determine why it was that in the same-cost
situation, the seller chose to sell at different prices.
It should be observed that in a highly competitive market a seller
could not sell identical products at different prices because other sellers
would concentrate on the high-price sector until such time as the price
in that sector had been driven down to the price in other sectors. For
example, the individual wheat farmer has neither the power nor the
incentive to discriminate because he can sell his entire product at the
market price and not a single bushel at any higher price.10 This is not
to say that a discriminating seller may not face considerable "competi-
tion" in the popular sense but rather only that by one means or another
the seller has sufficient economic power to set the price, within certain
limits, for his own products in at least the high price sector."
It should be observed further that the two sectors must be effectively
separated in some way in order for the seller to be able to maintain
differential prices. In the absence of such separation, purchasers in the
high price sector would shift their purchases to the low price sector and,
assuming the lower price reflects additional competition in that sector,
the low price sector sellers would shift their sales to the high price
sectors. Many techniques may be utilized to separate two classes of pur-
chasers. For example, the same devices which serve to give the seller a
measure of monopoly power, such as trademarks and brand-name ad-
vertising, may also serve to separate the market for such trademarked or
branded merchandise from the market for identical products not bearing
the trademark or brand name.
Assuming then, in order to simplify the analysis, that the seller has a
complete monopoly and can separate the high price from the low price
sectors, the question is why he will charge purchasers different prices
rather than a single "monopoly" price-that is, a single price which will
maximize his monopoly profits. A preliminary observation is that the
seller will charge differential prices only where there is a difference in
the elasticity of demand (that is to say, the extent to which quantity
demanded falls as price rises) of purchasers in the various sectors. The
seller, rather than quoting a single price, will attempt to set prices which
differ according to the quantity demanded. To put the principle in
10 The example ignores the possible effect of federal regulation of wheat growing
and marketing on the legal right of the farmer to sell or pledge his wheat at fixed
sale or loan prices.
11 Aside from the situation where the natural workings of the -market produce a
structure with a limited number of sellers, power over price may stem, to take a few
examples, from collusion among sellers, from lawful monopolies stemming from
patents and from marketing techniques designed to create a series of markets for
physically similar products including use of trademarks and brand name advertising.
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somewhat more precise terms, where elasticity of demand differs among
sectors, the seller will sell in each sector at that price at which the addi-
tions to gross revenues from sale of an additional unit will equal addi-
tions to costs with respect to each sector. He will thereby maximize profits
with respect to each class. The aggregate monopoly profit thus obtained
will necessarily be greater than that which would be obtained through a
single price. At any single price there would always remain the op-
portunity to increase total net profit by increasing or decreasing price
to at least one class.
Application of the line of reasoning just set forth also reveals, and
this is a point frequently ignored in the enforcement of anti-discrimina-
tion statutes, that charging the same price to two purchasers where the
seller's costs with respect to each differ must similarly be considered
discrimination.' 2 Here again the seller is seeking to maximize monopoly
profit based on differences in the elasticity of demand of the purchasers.
Where the incremental costs of whatever kind associated with additional
sales differ between two sectors (as, for example, where the costs of
distribution of an otherwise identical product differ with respect to each
sector), competition would result in a price differential between the
two sectors equal to the differential in such incremental costs. So long
as additions to gross revenues from additional sales to one sector ex-
ceeded additions to costs, competitors would concentrate on selling to
that sector until, through a reduction in prices to that sector, additions
to gross revenues and costs were equal. Similarly, if additions to gross
revenues from sales to another class were less than additions to cost,
sales to that sector would be discouraged until such time as, through
an increase in prices to that sector, additions to gross revenues and costs
were equal. The monopolist, free from the constraints of competition
and seeking to maximize monopoly profits with respect to each class,
will find that the profit maximizing price structure will not always be
one at which the differential in price is equal to the differential in
incremental costs. To avoid inconveniences in quoting prices and pro-
tests of unfairness by customers (as well as avoiding, as we shall see,
liability under certain price discrimination statutes such as the Robinson-
Patman Act), the monopolist may select uniform prices even though uni-
form prices might not yield the theoretically maximum total profits.
12 That differential costs and equal prices constitute price discrimination is a point
frequently made in the secondary literature, but it is unfortunately rarely if ever ex-
plained why that is so. See, e.g., Arr'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 333-34
(1955); EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2; RowE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 29; Adelman,
The Consistency of the Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAN. L. REV. 3, 4-5 (1953); Adelman,
Price Discrimination as Treated in the Attorney General's Report, 104 U. PA. L. REv.
222, 223 (1954); Adelman, Book Review, 50 Am. ECON. REv. 790 (1960).
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Thus, where incremental costs differ, uniform prices signal the existence
of economic discrimination.
From the foregoing analysis, one may conclude that economic dis-
crimination occurs whenever differentials in price for a single product
are not related to differentials in incremental costs. This definition is
somewhat ambiguous because its generality masks two technical issues:
(1) whether a nondiscriminatory price structure involves price differen-
tials equal or proportional to incremental costs; 13 and (2) whether the
relevant marginal costs are of the short-term or of the long-term variety.14
While it cannot be said that either of these issues is unimportant, never-
theless the agencies and courts charged with administering the three
statutory schemes in question are so far from comprehending the es-
sential nature of economic discrimination that a discussion of these
highly sophisticated sub-issues would not further the present inquiry
into the administration of the three statutory schemes under review.
A further, and more substantial, ambiguity lies in the concept of a
single product. In many cases, whether or not a given price structure
is discriminatory will turn on a determination whether one or two
products are involved.15 Resolution of this issue in a particular case
may be a subtle and uncertain exercise. Any of a number of criteria
might be emphasized in reaching a judgment. For example, products
may be the same in the sense that the objects themselves are physically
identical. On the other hand, one may stress the function to be performed
in order to find sameness despite physical differences. Or it may be im-
portant whether the two items are turned out by the same production
base or are, on the contrary, the end results of different production
processes. One may, however, depart entirely from such criteria in order
to emphasize the judgment of the market place on the matter. Under
this view, products are different which consumers judge to be different.
Attention is drawn to trademarks, labels, packaging and similar factors
which tend to differentiate products in the public mind. This approach
may easily carry one too far because a seller could justify any differential
unrelated to marginal costs by a perfunctory change, for example, in
labels. Perhaps the principle might be qualified to avoid that danger by
13 The proportionality alternative is chosen hereafter in the text, but that choice
is not meant to exclude the alternative of equal margins of price over incremental
costs as a permissible definition. Compare STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 215 (rev.
ed. 1952), with Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAN. L.
REv. 3, 4-5 (1953). See also Adelman, Price Discrimination as Treated in the Attorney
General's Report, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 222, 223 n.6a (1955).
14 See, e.g.. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 317-36 (1961); Adelman,
The Consistency of the Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAN. L. REv. 3, 22 (1953).
15 See Director, Book Review, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 606, 608 (1957).
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requiring the seller to show that the difference in label had created in the
minds of customers generally a sufficiently concrete belief that different
products were involved so that they would be willing to pay a higher
price in the case of one label than in the case of the other. The diffi-
culties with such a consumer opinion approach are, however, more
fundamental. A rule based on this theory would tend to encourage the
type of behavior by sellers which makes possible effective economic dis-
crimination-that is, adoption of techniques designed to differentiate
customer demands so that customers in the higher price sector will be
unwilling to accept, despite the price differential, the lower price item.
These techniques, which tend to make discrimination more effective,
should hardly be encouraged by any statute designed to eliminate eco-
nomic discrimination. While the appropriate resolution of this issue is
far from apparent, an approach emphasizing physical characteristics
seems preferable. Where services rather than goods are involved, the
problem is doubly difficult. Physical characteristics, while perhaps still
a possible criterion, are difficult to measure and the function served by
the services assumes a higher significance.
One of the most difficult problems in regulating economic discrimina-
tion is to determine whether price differentials unrelated to cost dif-
ferentials constitute economic discrimination where the seller faces
greater competition in the low than in the high price sector. Should a
price differential be deemed illegal where the seller quoted the lower
price merely in order to meet competition from another seller? This
approach, recognizing that where sellers' incremental costs do not vary
differential pricing arises from differences in buyers' elasticity of demand,
would distinguish two, types of differential charging: first, where the
difference in elasticity of demand arises from differences in purchasers'
tastes for and use of the product; and second, where the difference in
elasticity of demand arises from differences in the competitive condition
of the market (for example, in the number of sellers) in the two sectors.
Thus, where the seller had a monopoly in one sector and faced many
competitors in another sector, his price in. the first sector would pre-
sumably be a higher monopoly price and in the second sector a lower
competitive price. No attempt will be made here to resolve the question
of the relevance of differing competitive conditions to economic dis-
crimination. The purpose of this paper is not primarily to construct an
abstract definition of economic discrimination but rather to examine
the techniques used to regulate discrimination.' 6 It should therefore be
16 While economic discrimination is certainly suspect among economists, see Dn1AM
& KAHN, FAIR COMPrON 202 (1954), the condemnation is far from universal. Eco-
nomic discrimination may under certain circumstances permit an increase in produc-
tion and, in declining cost industries, through increased production, lower prices for
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observed that if one adopts the position that differential pricing arising
from differences in competitive conditions is not discrimination, it would
not be necessary to consider the desirability of a meeting competition
defense because such a defense would be superfluous. But if discrimination
is defined more broadly, the availability of a meeting competition de-
fense becomes crucial. The question will therefore be examined in the
following manner. Following the general review of the three statutory
schemes and the regulation of various types of discriminatory practices
thereunder, the relevance of competition as a defense will be examined
under each of the three schemes.
II. THE STATUTES
A. The Robinson-Patman Act
The Robinson-Patman Act,17 unlike the Interstate Commerce Act and
state public utility statutes, is almost exclusively concerned with dis-
crimination.' s The core of the act is section 2(a)19 which, in general,
all purchasers. In some cases, economic discrimination may permit production of
goods which would not be produced at all in the absence of such discrimination. See
generally ROBINSON, THE ECONOMIcs oF IMpEFEcT CoMpErION 179-208 (1933). And
economic discrimination may allow a greater degree of price rivalry between firms in
a market with few sellers than would otherwise be likely. See McGee, Price Discrimina-
tion and Economic Effects: The Standard Oil of Indiana Case, 23 U. CHri. L. REv. 398
(1956).
Since economic discrimination is possible, however, only where sellers have a measure
of monopoly power, it might be thought preferable to deal with that disease directly
rather than with mere symptoms like discrimination. But in many industries it may
be hopeless to attempt to create enough firms to eliminate the opportunity for dis-
crimination. And there are so strongly entrenched in the economy so many monopolies
created by the legal system that their elimination cannot be considered a practicable
alternative to regulation of economic discrimination.
It might be proposed that regulatory agencies be empowered, through control over
prices, to create artificially the price structure and hence the allocation of resources
that would exist under competition. One approach, usually found in the literature
on public utilities, is that prices be set equal to marginal costs without regard to
so-called fixed costs or to the nature of purchasers' demands. See, e.g., BONBRIHTrr, op.
cit. supra note 14; Coase, The Marginal Cost Controversy, 13 ECONOMICA 169 (1946);
Vickrey, Some Implications of Marginal Cost Pricing for Public Utilities, 45 Alf. EcoN.
REv., PROcEDINrs 605 (1955). There are grave questions, however, whether such a
scheme of mandatory cost pricing can be effectively required by law and efficiently
administered by regulatory agencies and whether the resulting direct regulation of
prices is desirable in its overall effect.
17 38 Stat. 730-31 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13(c) (1958).
18 Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act goes beyond an anti-discrimination
statute insofar as it prohibits, inter alia, selling or contracting to sell goods "at un-
reasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a com-
petitor." For a comprehensive discussion of this provision, see ROWE, op. cit. supra
note 5, at 452-75; see also United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29
(1963).
19 "(a) It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
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makes it unlawful "to discriminate in price between different pur-
chasers of commodities of like grade and quality." The key concept, "to
discriminate in price," has been construed to refer simply to the charg-
ing of different prices.2 0 A prima-facie case is made out by establishing
that a seller has, with respect to "commodities of like grade and quality,"
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality where either or any of the pur-
chases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are
sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof
or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the juris-
diction of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants
or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either
of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which
make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery
resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to
such purchasers sold or delivered: Provided, however, That the Federal Trade Com-
mission may, after due investigation and hearing to all interested parties, fix and
establish quantity limits, and revise the same as it finds necessary, as to particular
commodities or classes of commodities, where it finds that available purchasers in
greater quantities are so few as to render differentials on account thereof unjustly
discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in any line of commerce; and the foregoing
shall then not be construed to permit differentials based on differences in quantities
greater than those so fixed and established: And provided further, That nothing
herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise
in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in
restraint of trade: And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent
price changes from time to time where in response to changing conditions affecting
the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned, such as but not limited to
actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods,
distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of business
in the goods concerned.
"(b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that
there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden
of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon
the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be
affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the
discrimination: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a
seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or
the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in
good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities
furnished by a competitor."
20 Section 2(c), the "brokerage" provision, makes it unlawful "to pay or grant, or
receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage or other compensation,
or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered" under certain
circumstances and with certain exceptions. For a comprehensive discussion of this
provision, see RowE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 330-62 (1962). Sections 2(d) and 2(e)
govern the legality of promotional payments, facilities and services. See id. at 363-420.
Since these subsections do not purport, strictly speaking, to regulate price discrimina-
tion, they will not be discussed here.
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charged two purchasers different prices and that competitive injury has
resulted.21 Such a prima-facie case can be defeated by a showing that,
under the proviso to section 2(a), the differential made "only due al-
lowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery
resulting from the differing method or quantities in which such com-
modities are ... sold or delivered" or that, under section 2(b), the lower
price "was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a com-
petitor."
1. Price Differential. The first element of a price discrimination charge
under the Robinson-Patman Act is, as the foregoing discussion suggests,
the existence of a price differential. A corollary of the principle that
discrimination under the act involves the charging of different prices
is that a seller cannot be held to have discriminated in price under
section 2(a) where he charges the same price to different purchasers even
though the costs involved in the two sales are different. 22 This rule is
completely at odds with the economic notion of discrimination which,
as we have seen, refers to the charging of prices not proportional to
costs.
2 3
2. Competitive Injury. The second element of a prima-facie case under
section 2(a) is competitive injury. It is illegal "to discriminate in price"
only where "the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
or to injure, destroy or prevent competition with any person who either
21 FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 548-49 (1960).
22 Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 353-54 (S.D.N.Y.
1960). See also Klein v. Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp. 560, 565 (D. Del. 1956), af'd, 237
F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956); FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 757 (1945). But see
FTC v. Standard Brands, 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951); Samuel H. Moss v. FTC, 148
F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945); setting forth the Second Circuit view that upon proof of a
price differential the burden of proof on competitive injury shifts to the defendant
seller. Consult RowE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 99-100.
23 See Note 12 and pages 6-7 supra. This anomalous effect of a purportedly anti-
discriminatory statute is occasionally observed by commentators but seldom defended.
Professor Corwin Edwards, however, argues: "[T]o require that every cost difference be
reflected in a price difference would be inappropriate, although buyers should have
an incentive to promote efficiency because they receive lower prices by doing so,
sellers, too, should have an incentive to adopt efficient methods because they might
be able to retain the gains derived therefrom. The appropriate statutory standard as
to the relation between price and cost is one in which cost advantage may be, but
need not be, passed on to the buyer." EDwARDs, THE PRIcE DISCRIMINATION LAW 615
(1959).
The difficulty with that view is that the seller always profits by discriminating for
otherwise he would not seek to discriminate. If the purpose of an anti-discrimination
law is to preclude discrimination, and not merely to provide economic security to
small distributors under a "fairness" theory, surely all forms of economic discrimina-
tion ought to be equally proscribed.
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grants or knowingly receives the benefits of such discrimination, or
with customers of either of them." Three principal categories of injury
have been distinguished: (1) Injury to competition among the seller and
his competitors (primary-line injury); (2) injury to competition among the
favored purchaser and his competitors (secondary-line injury); and (3)
injury to competition among the customers of the favored buyers and
those customers' competitors (tertiary-line injury).24
It is doubtful that tertiary-line injury will support a section 2(a) viola-
tion except perhaps in rather unusual circumstances, but either primary
or secondary-line injury will clearly suffice. A decisive difference between
the latter two types of injury is that the courts have required far more de-
rangement of the market at the primary line than at the secondary line.
Thus, in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., the Supreme Court adopted the rather
expansive view that the requisite injury to competition at the purchasers'
level could be established by demonstrating an "injury to the com-
petition victimized by the discrimination" and that no specific evidence
of injury, beyond the fact of substantial difference in price on sales
to the favored and disfavored purchasers, was necessary to prove "what
would appear to be obvious, that the competitive opportunities of
certain merchants were injured when they had to pay ... substantially
more for their goods than their competitors had to pay."25 In spite of
the breadth of the Court's language, counsel supporting a complaint in
FTC proceedings continue to offer independent evidence of injury at the
secondary level (such as the loss of business by, or impairment of the
profits of, disfavored customers).26 It is nonetheless dear that a sub-
stantially higher standard of proof is required in a primary-line than in
a secondary-line case. In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC2 7 the Seventh
Circuit held that injury to a competitor as opposed to injury to competi-
24 Tertiary-line injury might arise where a manufacturer-seller, selling to both
wholesalers and retailers, sells to the former at a price so much lower than to the
latter that the wholesaler can sell to other retailers at less than the manufacturer's
price to retailers. See generally RowE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 205. But, of course, the
direct buying retailer may choose in such a case to buy from the wholesaler thereby
limiting any injury.
25 334 U.S. 37, 49, 50 (1948). The test, according to Justice Black writing for the
Court, was whether there was a "reasonable possibility" (rather than a probability or
likelihood) that the price differential would have the specified effects.
26 See United Biscuit Co., No. 7817, FTC, June 28, 1962; Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n,
Nos. 7225, 7496, FTC, May 10, 1962; cf. Fred Bronner Corp., 57 F.T.C. 766 (1960). Testi-
mony by the nonfavored purchasers that they were not in fact injured has been in-
sufficient to overcome the inference of injury arising from a substantial difference in
price. E. Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956); Moog Indus., Inc. v.
FTC, 238 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1956). That independent evidence of injury may be required
where the differentials are sporadic rather than systematic is suggested by American
Oil Co., No. 8183, FTC, June 27, 1962.
27 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
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tion was not sufficient to establish requisite primary-line injury. Section
2(a), said the court "is not concerned with mere shifts of business between
competitors" but rather "with substantial impairment of the vigor or
health of the contest for business, regardless of which competitor wins
or loses."2 8 Because the standard for secondary-line injury is so much
easier to meet, the FTC usually attempts to establish primary-line injury
only in cases where no substantial competition exists between the favored
and disfavored purchasers.
3. Cost Justification. Even though a differential in price between
purchasers may injure competition in the statutory sense, the differential
is not unlawful where the defendant establishes that the differential
makes "only due allowance for differentials in the cost of manufacture,
sale or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in
which such commodities are to such purchasers sold."29 Thus, the
Robinson-Patman Act reflects legislative awareness that differentials
in price which merely reflect differentials in cost should not be proscribed
as discriminatory.
The cost justification defense may not be adequate to offset the basic
tendency of the act, particularly as administered, to require price
uniformity and thereby to promote economic discrimination. First, the
burden of proof is placed upon the defendant to establish the defense.
Second, such a high degree of specificity and completeness of evidence is
required that the normal accounting records maintained by a business
enterprise will seldom suffice to establish the defense.3 0 In reviewing the
FTC's requirements the Supreme Court observed that "the Commission
28 Id. at 840, on remand from FTC v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960). See
also Atlas Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 954-55 (10th Cir.
1959). The Seventh Circuit did suggest, however, that in geographical discrimination
cases, proof of predatory intent (buccaneering) might substitute for proof of sub-
stantial injury to competitors. 289. F.2d at 843. See Pure Oil Co., No. 6640, FTC,
Sept. 28, 1962; see also Atlas Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d
950 (10th Cir. 1959), for the proposition that the seller's size, economic power and
comparative prices may be considered in determining the effect on primary-line
injury. It must be recognized, however, that the Anheuser-Busch decision was a defeat
for the position, asserted from time to time by the FTC, under which competitive
primary-line injury could be made out by a showing that business had been diverted
from a competing seller, whether or not there had been any deterioration in the
quality of competition at the seller level. See, e.g., Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator
Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948), rev'd, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 206
(1952); Samuel H. Moss, Inc., 36 F.T.C. 640 (1943), aff'd, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945),
modified, 155 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1946). Indeed, there is some question whether the
FTC is prepared to accept the Anheuser-Busch doctrine in full. See Forster Mfg. Co.,
No. 7207, FTC, March 18, 1963.
29 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
30 See Sawyer, Cost Justification of Quantity Differentials, 1 ANTIrrUsr BULL. 573,
578-80 (1956).
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has not been content with accounting estimates; a study seems to be
required, involving perhaps stopwatch studies, numerical counts of
invoices or bills and in some instances of the number of items or
entries on such records, or other such quantitative measurement .... ."1
Finally, it is not sufficient to establish that the costs in question differ
substantially; the FTC seems to require that the price differential be
justified to very nearly the last sou 32 by concrete, specific quantitative
data. As a consequence of these restrictive standards, cost justification
defenses have been exceedingly difficult to establish. The Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws may not have
gone too far in concluding that the defense "has proved largely illusory
in practice." 33 The effect of these rigorous requirements is to induce
sellers to reflect less than the full extent of cost differentials in prices
charged and hence to engage in conduct which can only be classified as
economic discrimination. 34
The availability of the cost justification defense is modified, more-
over, by the power of the FTC, set forth in the second proviso to section
2(a), to "fix and establish quantity limits . . . as to particular com-
modities or classes of commodities, where it finds that available pur-
chasers in greater quantities are so few as to render differentials on ac-
count thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in any
line of commerce." Where the quantity limits power of the FTC is
invoked, cost is totally disregarded and economic discrimination must
result.3 5
B. The Interstate Commerce Act
In turning from the Robinson-Patman Act to the Interstate Com-
merce Act,36 one is immediately struck by the difference in terminology
used in discussing problems of discrimination. It is traditional under
31 Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 68 (1953); see Borden Co., No. 7129,
FTC, Nov. 28, 1962.
32 See Thompson Prod., Inc., 55 F.T.C. 1252 (1959).
33 ATT'Y. GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 171 (1955).
34 See Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAN. L. REv. 3,
7-14 (1953).
35 The quantity-limits provision, while showing a high disregard of the drafters
for the nature of economic discrimination, is not particularly significant in the en-
forcement of the act in view of the FTC's reluctance to call on its statutory power.
Quantity limits have been imposed in only a single proceeding, but the order, directed
at automotive replacement tires and tubes, was set aside by a district court. B.F. Good-
rich Co. v. FTC, 134 F. Supp. 39 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 242 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See,
for a general discussion of the proviso, Arr'Y. GEN. NATL COMM.-ANTRUsrT RE. 176-
77 (1955); EDwARDs, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAw 271-85 (1959); ROWE, op. cit. supra
note 5, at 312-20.
36 24 Stat. 379-87 (1887), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1958).
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the latter statute to distinguish three types of discrimination-personal
discrimination, discrimination among commodities and discrimination
among localities. Personal discrimination refers to discrimination among
shippers of like commodities between the same points of origin and
destination. Discrimination among commodities refers to discrimination
among shippers based upon differences in the kinds of commodities
shipped by each. Discrimination among localities involves discrimination
among shippers engaged in the shipment of like commodities where the
shipments in question are from different points of origin or to different
points of destination.
The Interstate Commerce Act contains general provisions forbidding
discrimination which are not fundamentally different from the Robinson-
Patman Act's proscriptions. Directed primarily at personal discrimination,
Section 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act prohibits, under the rubric of
"unjust discrimination," the charging of "a greater or less compensation"
to one shipper than another with respect to "a like kind of traffic under
substantially similar circumstances and conditions."37 Section 3 also
reaches personal discrimination but is more significant for its proscription
of discrimination among commodities and among localities. It prohibits
both "any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage" to any
shipper and subjection of any shipper to "any undue or unreasonable
prejudices or disadvantages in any respect whatsoever." 38 Section 4, the
Long-and-Short-Haul clause, is directed against a very particular form
of discrimination among localities-charging more for a short haul than
for a long haul over the same line in the same direction, the shorter
being included within the longer.39
37 "[It shall be unlawful for] any common carrier ... directly or indirectly, by any
special rate, rebate, drawback, or other device, [to] charge, demand, collect, or receive
from any person or persons a greater or less compensation for any service rendered,
or to be rendered, in the transportation of passengers or property . . .than it charges,
demands, collects or receives from any other person or persons for doing for him or
them a like or contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traf-
fic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions .... ".24 Stat. 379-80
(1887), 49 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
38 "It shall be unlawful for any common carrier . .. to make or give undue
or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm,
corporation, association, locality, port, port district, gateway transit point, region,
district, territory, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever."
49 Stat. 107 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1958). Section 3(4) prohibits a specific kind of
discrimination; carriers are forbidden to "discriminate in their rates, fares, and
charges between connecting lines, or unduly prejudice any connecting line in the
distribution of traffic that is not specifically routed by the shipper." See Dixie Car-
riers v. United States, 351 U.S. 56 (1956); ICC v. Mechling Barge Line, 330 U.S. 567
(1947); Arrow Transp. Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Ala. 1959), aJ'd
per curiam, 361 U.S. 353 (1960).
39 "It shall be unlawful for any common carrier ... to charge or receive any
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If the statutory basis for regulation of discrimination by railroads had
been limited to the foregoing sections, a development of the law on a
case-by-case basis leading to a legal scheme not unlike that under the
Robinson-Patman Act might have been anticipated. There are, however,
a number of crucial differerfces between the regulation imposed by the
Interstate Commerce Act and that imposed by the Robinson-Patman Act.
First, as in the case with most industries classified as regulated, the
Interstate Commerce Act gives the ICC power to regulate the general
level of rates. Thus, the ICC may regulate the overall level of rates of
carriers in order to assure that such rates are "just and reasonable." 40
In general,; the purpose of rate-level regulation is to assure that the rail-
roads' return on invested capital is not excessive.
Second, the ICC has the power, quite aside from its power to regulate
discriminatory rates, to regulate individual rates to assure that they are
"just and reasonable." 41 Because this power extends to determining
minimum, as well as maximum, individual rates, the Commission may,
and often does, use this power in lieu of its statutory powers over dis-
crimination. For example, minimum rate regulation is most important
in cases where railroads reduce specific rates in response to competition
from truck or barge lines, a situation which would normally also give
rise to a geographical discrimination problem.4 2 While the portion of
greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers, or of like
kind of property, for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line or route
in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance, or to
charge any greater compensation as a through route than the aggregate of the inter-
mediate rates . . . Provided, That upon application to the Commission and after
investigation, such carrier, in special cases, may be authorized by the Commission to
charge less for longer than for shorter distances for the transportation of passengers
or property and the Commission may from time to time prescribe the extent to which
such designated carriers may be relieved from the operation of this section .
54 Stat. 904 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 4(1) (1958).
40 24 Stat. 379, 384, (1887), 41 Stat. 488, (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1, 15,
15(a) (1958). For a general discussion of rate level regulation, see LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS
OF TRANSPORTATION 332-429 (4th ed. 1954); SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMaERCE
COMMISSION, Pt. III, vol. B, pp. 1-308 (1936).
41 24 Stat. 379, 384 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 1, 15 (1958). For a general discussion of
regulation of individual rates, see LoCKLIN, op. cit. supra note 40, at 430-78.
42 In 1958 Section 15a(3) was added to the act to guidd the Commission in mini-
mum rate cases involving intermodal competition. While prior to the amendment
the Commission had been charged to "consider the facts and circumstances attending
the movement of the traffic by the carrier or carriers to which the rate is applicable,"
the 1958 amendment puts it on notice that "rates of a 'carrier shall not be held up
to a particular level to protect the traffic of any other mode of transportation, giving
due consideration to the objectives of the national transportation policy .... " While
it is generally agreed that the purpose of the 1958 amendment was to give the rail-
roads more freedom to lower individual rates to meet truck and barge competition,
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the paper devoted to the ICC deals only with discrimination problems
which are treated as such by the ICC, an exhaustive treatment of rail-
road discrimination would involve a full scale analysis of the ICC's
minimum rate powers and their relation to intermode competition.43
The third, and perhaps most significant, difference between the
regulated and unregulated sectors of the United States economy lies
in the almost universal requirement, where rates are subject to regula-
tion, that all rates be filed with a regulatory agency before becoming ef-
fective. In the case of railroads Section 6 of the Interstate Commerce
Act requires that railroads "file with the Commission ... and print and
keep open to public inspection schedules showing all the rates, fares, and
charges," that no change should be made except upon thirty days notice
and that the railroads refrain from departing from the filed rate for any
purpose.4 4 Section 6 as originally enacted did not prove fully effective in
preventing departures from published rates by covert methods such as
rebates, underbilling and false classification. This weakness in the
original act was remedied in the Elkins Act of 190345 which prohibited
enjoyment of the fruits of personal discrimination by the favored shipper
as well as by providing more effective penalties against carriers for
departures from published rates. Under the Elkins Act, a shipper "who
shall knowingly . .. directly or indirectly, by or through any means or
device whatsoever, receive or accept from a common carrier any sum of
money or any other valuable consideration as a rebate or offset against
the regular charges for transportation of such property, as fixed by the
there is considerable dispute about the exact meaning of the new statutory language,
particularly its reference to the national transportation policy, and the Commission's
interpretation appears to have varied from time to time.
43 The literature on intermode competition and the minimum-rate power is exten-
sive and growing at a rapid rate. Among recent comments, see, e.g., FRIENDLY, THE
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATivE AGENCIES 106-40 (1962); FULDA, CoMPEITION IN THE REGU-
LATED INDUSTRIEs: TRANSPORTATION 339-74 (1961); WILLIAMS, THE REGULATION OF RAIL-
MOTOR RATE CoNprrrioN (1958); Report by the Special Study Group on Transporta-
tion Policies in the United States of the Committee on Commerce, S. REP. No. 445,
87th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 385-444 (1961) [hereinafter cited as the Doyle Report]; Com-
ment, 73 HARv. L. REv. 762 (1960); and many articles in recent volumes of the I.C.C.
Practitioner's Journal.
44 24 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 6 (1958). Section 6 has been so
scrupulously enforced that it has been held that even where the filed rate is clearly
erroneous and manifestly inadequate to compensate the railroad, the filed rate must
be followed. Armour & Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 254 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1958);
Tobin Packing Co. v. Baltimore 8, 0. R.R., 299 I.C.C. 221 (1956); Ryan Co. v. Mis-
souri Pac. R.R., 177 I.C.C. 348 (1931).
45 32 Stat. 847 (1903), 49 U.S.C. § 41 (1958). For a description of the weaknesses
of the enforcement machinery of the original Interstate Commerce Act sought to be
remedied by the Elkins Act, see LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION 212-13 (5th
ed. 1960).
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schedule of rates" 46 is liable to pay the government three times the con-
sideration received by the carrier. Because rates must be published, most
examples of personal discriminations today involve either covert de-
partures from published rates or the transfer of money or property to
the shipper as part of a collateral transaction. 47 Thus, the opportunities
for secret differential pricing are almost totally eliminated.
Fourth, while in the unregulated sector agreement on prices among
competitors constitutes a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act,48 such agreements among competing railroads are not only lawful
under the Interstate Commerce Act but where arrived at by rate bureaus
approved by the ICC, such agreements are specifically insulated from
attack under the antitrust laws by the 1948 Reed-Bulwinkle amendment
to the Interstate Commerce Act.49 This amendment, which confirmed
the existing railroad practice of collectively determining rates through
rate bureaus, tends to insulate systematic discrimination from the
inevitable attrition which would be produced by competition among
railroads in the setting of rates.50
46 34 Stat. 587 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 41(3) (1958). The Hepburn Act of 1906, 34 Stat.
584 (1906), has several provisions directly aimed at personal discrimination. The
most important, the "commodities clause," prohibits a railroad from transporting
commodities manufactured, mined or produced by it or in which it has an interest
(other than timber and commodities intended for its use in the conduct of its busi-
ness as a common carrier). 34 Stat. 585 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1958). The purpose
of the clause was to deny railroads owning coal mines an advantage they purportedly
had over other owners of coal mines. The theory was that such railroads, having a
monopoly of transportation from the coal field, could gain an added advantage for
their coal mine by charging high rates for carriage of competitors' coal. Under this
theory such competitors would be injured, even though the same rates were charged
for carriage from the railroads' mines, for that would be "simply taking money from
one pocket and transferring it to the other." See LoCKLIN, op. cit. supra note 45, at 216.
For an analysis and criticism of this theory, see Bork, Vertical Integration and the
Sherman Act, 22 U. CH. L. REV. 157, 194-201 (1954).
47 The most obvious form of departure from a published tariff is the rebate, a
remission to the shipper of a portion of the published rate. Such rebates violate both
Section 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act and the Elkins Act, however indirectly
the rebate may reach the shipper. Union Pac. Ry. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941).
But the duty to adhere to published tariffs can also be breached by providing more
service than the tariff requires. While discrimination normally results from such addi-
tional service, the essence of the violation of the Elkins Act is the departure from
the tariff and thus it is irrelevant that no competitive injury results.
48 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). See also United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940); Comment, The Per Se Il-
legality of Price-Fixing-Same Power, Purpose or Effect, 19 U. CH. L. RMEV. 837 (1952).
49 62 Stat. 472 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 5(b) (1958); see FULDA, ComPETrroN IN THE REGU-
LATED INDUSTRIES-TRANSPORTATION 283-309 (1961). The act was a legislative response to the
initiative of the commencement of a Sherman Act action by the Department of
Justice against the rate-bureau activities of a group of midwestem railroads in a
federal district court in Nebraska. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania, 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
50 The only significant restrictions are that the resulting agreements must preserve
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C. State Utilities Legislation
State statutes regulating electric utilities have widely differing provi-
sions governing discrimination. 51 Quite general terms such as "discrimi-
nation," "prejudice," "preference" and "disadvantage" are used to
describe the proscribed activity. 52 Qualifying words such as "unjust,"
"undue" and "unreasonable" are frequently used.53 Typically neither
costs nor competition are mentioned in the statute and if cost justifica-
tion and meeting competition defenses are to be recognized, they must
be read into the more general statutory terms. Many statutes do not
specifically mention discrimination but the duty to refrain from
discrimination is inferred either from the general power of the local
commission to regulate rates or from the common-law duty of a public
utility to serve all without discrimination.
In considering regulation of discrimination by electric utilities, it is
important to note certain features of state regulation which significantly
affect both the character of this discrimination and the regulation im-
posed by the state commissions. For example, rates and rate changes must
normally be filed and departures from filed rates are prohibited; thus,
rate differentials are on public record for all to see and secret rate cutting
is illegal.5 4 Further, such statutes typically restrict entry so that, except
occasionally where a municipal utility provides competition for a
regional private utility system or at the border between the service
areas of two utilities, a single firm has a legal monopoly over the business
of providing electric service.55 Even where entry is not limited, the
each carrier's right of independent action and receive ICC approval. For an example
of the content of such a rate bureau agreement and the ICC's attitude, see Western
Traffic Association-Agreement, 276 I.C.C. 183 (1949).
51 The conventional state method of regulating electric utilities is through a state
public service commission. According to responses to a 1960 Federal Power Com-
mission inquiry, only six states did not have such commissions. In some of those 'six
states electric utilities were regulated in other ways. FPC, STATE Co.rarISSION JURISDIC-
TION AND REGULATION OF ELECRaIC AND GAS UTILrrIES 2-3 (1960). On regulation of electric
utilities, see generally Hale 9- Hale, Competition or Control V: Production and Distribu-
tion of Electric Energy, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 57 (1961).
52 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-334 (1956); 26 DEL. CODE § 161 (1953); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. 378:10 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. 48:3-1 (1940); 66 PA. STAT. § 1144
(1957). But see, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 54-702 (1951); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-157 (1937).
53 See, e.g., 26 DEL. CODE § 161 (1953); IND. ANN. STAT. § 54-702 (1951); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. 378:10 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. 48:3-1 (1940); 66 PA. STAT. § 1144 (1959).
54 "All State commissions with power to regulate rates of electric and gas utilities
have the power .. . to require prior authorization of rate changes and to suspend
proposed rate changes, and to initiate rate investigations of privately owned electric
and gas utilities .. " FPC, op. cit. supra note 51, at 3; see WELcH, CASES ON PUBLIC
UTILITY REGULATION 491-98 (1961).
55 "The areas in which electric or gas utilities operate are generally controlled by
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economies of scale may be such that it would be difficult for two electric
companies to coexist in the same territory.56 Because of this monopoly
element, regulation of maximum rate levels and maximum individual
rates is common.57 Where regulation of rate structures extends to both
maximum and minimum individual rates, an alternative statutory
mechanism is available for dealing with discrimination problems. While
individual rates are sometimes set aside as below cost,58 there does not
appear to be any substantial use of the minimum rate power, used by
the ICC to shield barge and truck lines from rail competition, to protect
competing sources of energy.
III. QUANTITY DISCOUNTS
The first specific pricing practice which warrants comparative examina-
tion is the quantity discount. The question, with respect to each of
the three forms of regulation under scrutiny, is under what circumstances
a seller may justify charging one purchaser a lower per-unit price than
another purchaser on the ground that the former purchases a larger
quantity than the latter.
A. Robinson-Patman Act
Quantity discounts are governed by the general provisions of Sections
2(a) and 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act. Thus, the per-unit price
differential inherent in a quantity discount is unlawful where com-
petitive injury results unless the seller establishes that the price dif-
ferential is cost justified or that the lower quantity price is offered to
meet an equally low quantity price of a competitor. An examination of
each of these three factors-competitive injury, cost justification and
meeting competition-reveals that the act, while in the abstract pre-
serving the seller's right to quote quantity discounts in certain situations,
tends in general to discourage such discounts. Except in the unusual case
wlere favored and disfavored purchasers do not compete with each other,
the requisite injury to competition at the secondary level is usually rather
easy for the FTC to establish, particularly where the purchasers compete
in the resale of the products in question. Thus, in FTC v. Morton Salt
certificates of convenience and necessity issued by regulatory commissions having
jurisdiction .... Franchises and permits from municipalities or other local authorities
are, also, generally required in these States and in States not issuing certificates." FPC,
op. cit. supra note 51, at 5. See also TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, ELECTRIC POWER AND
GOVERNMENT POLICY 58 n.1 (1948); Hale & Hale, supra note 51; Knier, Competitive
Operation of Municipally and Privately Owned Utilities, 47 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1949).
56 See TROXEL, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 25-37 (1947).
57 See Hale & Hale, supra note 51, at 68-70, and authorities cited therein.
58 E.g., Re Kaukana Elec. & Water Dep'ts, 1929E P.U.R. 491 (Wis. R.R. Comm'n
1929).
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Co.,?o the Supreme Court indicated that where favored and disfavored
purchasers resell in competition with each other, the requisite com-
petitive injury may be inferred from the fact of a substantial price
differential. 60 While the cost justification defense saves some discounts
based on quantity per shipment, volume discounts based on purchases
during a given time period can rarely be cost justified.6 1 And since the
meeting competition defense is limited to individual reductions in price
designed to meet the equally low price of a competitor, that defense
will seldom justify the systematic differentials inherent in a quantity
discount system.0 2
The Robinson-Patman Act's hostility to quantity discounts extends
well beyond that necessary to eliminate economic discrimination.63 The
act fails to require quantity discounts in situations where the sale of a
larger quantity to one purchaser results in lower unit costs to the seller
on sales to that purchaser than to purchasers of smaller quantities.6 4
The act thereby fails to proscribe one important instance of economic
discrimination. More significantly, formidable restrictions on the cost
justification defense encourage sellers to engage in economic discrimina-
tion, at least to the extent of not reflecting fully in quantity discounts
59 334 U.S. 37, 47 (1948).
00 Where the purchasers are manufacturers rather than resellers and the dif-
ferentially priced commodity is only one item in the cost of the purchaser's manu-
factured product, the Morton Salt rule would seem inapplicable and independent
evidence would have to be introduced to establish the requisite injury to secondary-
line competition. See Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786
(7th Cir. 1951). Perhaps Minneapolis-Honeywell stands only for the proposition that
the defendant is permitted in such a situation to offer independent evidence to rebut
any presumption arising from proof of a substantial price difference.
61 Standard Motor Prod., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1959); P. Sorenson
Mfg. Co. v. FFC, 246 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1957); P. & D. Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 245 F.2d
281 (7th Cir. 1957); C. E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1957), modified,
Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 US. 411 (1958); Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, 239 F.2d
253 (7th Cir. 1956); E. Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956); Moog
Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 411 (1958); American Can
Co. v. Bruce's Juices, Inc., 187 F.2d 919, upheld on rehearing, 190 F.2d 73 (5th Cir.
1951); see H.C. Brill Co., 26 F.T.C. 666, 678 (1938); cf. United States v. Borden Co., 370
U.S. 460 (1962); Mid-South Distrib. v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1961); American
Motor Specialties Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1960). But cf. American Can Co. v.
Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951).
62 See discussion at pp. 49-50 infra.
63 It might be argued, however, that the FTC's emphasis in its enforcement policy
on volume discounts based on quantities purchased over a prescribed period rather
than discounts based on quantities purchased in a single transaction indicates that the
Commission is sensitive to cost factors. The former kind of discounts are less likely
to reflect cost savings. See EDwARws, THE PRIcE DIscRinNATION LAw 208-10 (1959), and
cases cited in note 61, supra.
64 See Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 87 F. Supp. 345, 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1960).
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the cost savings of quantity sales. While the substantive rule is that
quantity discounts are lawful where cost justified, the act places the
burden of proving cost justification on the seller, a burden which, as we
have seen, involves a very high standard of proof. 65
The Robinson-Patman Act's hostility to quantity discounts, even where
no economic discrimination is involved, is highlighted by the quantity
limits provision. Where only a few purchasers buy in large quantities, the
FTC in a quantity limits proceeding may prohibit quantity discounts
even though the differential in costs clearly would support a differential
in price in a conventional section 2(a) price discrimination proceeding
and economic discrimination could thus be avoided only by requiring
such quantity discounts. For those who believe that the proof of the
pudding is in the eating, it may be well however to observe that the
quantity limits proviso has been invoked by the FTC only once and in
that case the reviewing court set aside the FTC order, albeit on rather
narrow technical grounds. 66
B. Interstate Commerce Act
The Interstate Commerce Act goes even further than the Robinson-
Patman Act in discouraging quantity discounts. Until 1939 the ICC
uniformly held all quantity discounts unlawful, except for the quantity
discounts inherent in the pervasive distinction between carload and less-
than-carload (LCL) shipments. 07 Higher rates on LCL than on carload
shipments were condoned from the very beginning of ICC regulation on
the theory that the shipments were made under dissimilar "circumstances
and conditions" within the meaning of section 2.68 The breadth of the
differential, however, does not appear to be subjected to scrutiny under
the "unjust discrimination" provisions of section 2.69 It would appear
65 "[Ojnly the most prosperous and patient business firm could afford pursuit of
[this] often illusory defense. Pressure builds to gain legal safety by withholding price
differentials from more efficient buyers, thus denying to the public the benefit of
mass production and economical distribution processes which Congress intended to
preserve ..... ArT'Y. GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 173 (1955). See discussion
of the difficulties of establishing the cost justification defense at pp. 13-14 supra.
66 See note 35 supra. The encouragement of economic discrimination inherent in
the Robinson-Patman Act is further highlighted by the denial of a cost justification
defense where a violation of the brokerage provision, § 2(c), or the promotional ar-
rangement provisions, §§ 2(d) and 2(e), is charged. See, respectively, FTC v. Henry
Broch & Co., 365 U.S. 166, 176 (1960); FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 70-71
(1959).
67 ICC v. Delaware L. & W. R.R., 220 U.S. 255, 241 (1911); Providence Coal Co., 1
I.C.C. 107 (1887).
68 Thurber v. N.Y.C. & H. R.R. Co., 3 I.C.C. 473 (1890); see Container Serv., 175
I.C.C. 577, 454-55 (1931).
69 But see occasional early cases such as Barrow v. Yazoo & M.V. R.R., 10 I.C.C. 553
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from the development of a separate freight forwarder industry dedicated
specifically to performing the service of consolidating LCL shipments
into carload lots that the differential in rates exceeds the difference in
costs.1 0 Thus, the ICC's general prohibitory policy tends to promote
economic discrimination, while through the major exception to that
policy-the carload-LCL differential-the ICC permits differentials
which, by exceeding costs, also constitute economic discrimination.
The development of large-scale intermode competition, particularly
from barges which are capable of carrying many times more freight than
a rail car, led the ICC, beginning in 1939, to permit railroads to quote
multiple carload rates in certain limited situations. 71 Except for certain
very recent cases, which are discussed below, the ICC has uniformly
required that the reduced rates be granted only where the larger quantity
was carried in a single shipment. Such multiple car rates may be in-
stituted, according to the ICC's formulation of the rule, only where
proved "to be compensatory, reasonably related to the single-car rates,
and necessary to meet the competition of large-volume carriers." 72 The
substantive standard for a "compensatory" rate and the standards of
proof required of the rail carrier proposing the multiple car rate, are
matters which the ICC has not clarified with any high degree of
precision, although in general terms a multiple car rate is "compensatory"
where it covers "out-of-pocket" costs as defined by the ICC.73 The
(1904); Harvard Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 4 I.C.C. 212 (1890). The breadth of the dif-
ferential is, of course, subject to indirect regulation under the requirement that
individual rates be "just and reasonable." See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
70 See ICC v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 220 U.S. 235, 243-45 (1911); SCHWARTZ, FREE
ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 521 (2d ed. 1959). The existence of "all
freight" and "all commodity" rates, developed to meet truck competition, but used
extensively by freight forwarders, may have something to do with the success of the
freight forwarder industry. See NATIONAL REsOURCES PLANNING BOARD, TRANSPORTATION
AND NATIONAL POLICY 105 (1942).
71 Asphalt to Iowa, Mich., Minn. & Wis., 316 I.C.C. 117 (1962); Grain from Kansas
City, Omaha & Related Origins to Lawrenceburg, Ind., 315 I.C.C. 83 (1961); Pig Iron
from Neville Island, Pa. to Louisville, Ky., 313 I.C.C. 771 (1961); Rock Salt from N.Y.
to Del., Md., N.J., N.Y., & Pa., 313 I.C.C. 197 (1961); Coal from Ill., Ind. & Ky. to
Ill. & Ind., 308 I.C.C. 673 (1959); John Schutt, Jr., Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
308 I.C.C. 217 (1959); Paper from St. Francisville, La. to Chicago, Ill., 306 I.C.C. 703
(1959); Eastern Coal to Chicago, Ill., 306 I.C.C. 195 (1959); Illinois Intrastate Coal Rates
to East St. Louis, Ill., 304 I.C.C. 769 (1958); Ex-River Coal, Mount Vernon, 296 I.C.C.
489 (1955); Limestone from Prairie du Rocher, Ill. to Baton Rouge, 276 I.C.C. 381
(1949); Molasses from New Orleans to Peoria & Pekin, 235 I.C.C. 485 (1939).
72 Asphalt to Iowa, Mich., Minn. & Wis., 316 I.C.C. 117, 125 (1962). See also Pig
Iron from Neville Island, Pa. to Louisville, Ky., 313 I.C.C. 771, 777 (1961); Rock Salt
from N.Y. to Del., Md., NJ. & Pa., 313 I.C.C. 197, 203 (1961).
73 See the conflicting opinions of Commission members on this issue in Limestone,
Prairie du Rocher, Ill., to Baton Rouge, La., 313 I.C.C. 71 (1960). On ICC cost-finding
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"reasonably related" standard is even more indefinite. In some cases the
ICC seems to have in mind a cost oriented interpretation which would
require a showing that the savings in cost from multiple car shipments
approximate the difference between the volume and carload rates,7 4
while in other cases it appears to consider that the test is whether the
volume rate is so much lower than the carload rate that carload shippers
suffer competitive injury.75 Where the only traffic of the commodity in
question over the route in question will be that carried under the
multiple car rate, the "reasonably related" standard appears to be
ignored.7 6 The meeting competition requirement for a volume rate is the
criterion most carefully adhered to and the ICC often undertakes a
careful study not only of the rates of the competing carrier but also,
at least where the competing carrier has not yet participated in the traffic
under consideration, of the competing carrier's ability to carry the
traffic profitably at that bid.77
In several relatively recent cases the ICC has permitted a volume rate
not limited to a single shipment. No rule has yet been clearly articulated
concerning the circumstances under which such multi-shipment rates
will be approved. In Coal from Ky., Va., & W. Va. to Virginia,7 s the Com-
mission permitted a volume rail rate for coal conditioned on the shipment
of at least 1,500,000 tons to a single consignee during a twelve month
period. -Here, unlike the multiple car, single shipment cases, the com-
petition did not come from a mode of transportation under the jurisdic-
techniques, see ICC, EXPLANATION OF RAIL COST FINDING, PROCEDURES AND PRINCIPLES
RELATING TO THE USE OF CoSTs (1954); MEYER, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN THE
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES 274-347 (1960). See also ICC v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R.,
195 F. Supp. 635, 647-49 (D. Conn. 1961), vacated and remanded, 372 U.S. 744
(1963).
74 See Paper from St. Francisville, La. to Chicago, Ill., 306 I.C.C. 703, 710 (1959);
Eastern Coal to Chicago, Ill., 306 I.C.C. 195, 199 (1959); Molasses from New Orleans,
La., to Peoria & Pekin, IIl., 235 I.C.C. 485, 502 (1939).
75 See Coal from Ill., Ind. & Ky. to Ill. & Ind., 308 I.C.C. 673, 678 (1959), where the
ICC, although conceding that "there is here no indication of a substantial difference
in the cost of transportation under the proposed multiple-car rates and under the
single-car rates," nonetheless found that the reduced volume rate was "properly
related" to the carload rate. The Commission argued that the sole shipper of single
carloads would not be injured.
76 See Grain from Kansas City, Omaha & Related Origins to Lawrenceburg, Ind., 315
I.C.C. 83 (1961); Limestone, Prairie du Rocher, Ill., to Baton Rouge, La., 313 I.C.C.
71 (1960).
77 See Limestone, Prairie du Rocher, Ill., to Baton Rouge, La., 313 I.C.C. 71
(1960). But see Rock Salt from N.Y. to Del., Md., N.J., N.Y. & Pa., 313 I.C.C. 197
(1961), where the competition came from ocean carriers outside the jurisdiction of
the ICC. The comparison of rail costs with barge costs gives rise to important
problems concerning relative costs in intermode conpetition which are beyond the
scope of this paper. See notes 42-43 supra.
78 308 I.C.C. 99 (1959).
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tion of the ICC. The carrier established that unless the consignee in
question, an electric utility, was granted the reduced volume rate, the
latter would rely on coal from land which it currently had under option
in the origin area and would substitute transmission line transportation
of electricity for rail transportation of coal. Multiple car, single shipment
volume rates were found inadequate to meet the competitive threat 9
The Commission noted that neither the shipper nor the consignee would
be imposed upon by the volume rate.
Quantity rates based on yearly receipts by a consignee were also
approved by the ICC in Coal to New York Harbor Area.80 At stake
was the shipment of coal to electric utilities in the Middle Atlantic sea-
board area and the principal competition was presented by residual oil
which came from foreign countries by unregulated ocean carriers. The
ICC emphasized that the proposed rates were compensatory and that
the utilities did not compete with any other coal receivers in the destina-
tion areas so that no injury to competition, would occur in the con-
signee's market. The decisive factor, according to the ICC, was that
regulated railroads were in immediate danger of losing a substantial
amount of coal traffic to unregulated ocean carriers of residual oil. Thus,
the shipments to electric utilities, which alone purchased enough coal
to qualify for the volume rates, were lawful.8'
This exception to the general rule against multi-shipment volume
rates which is thus being carved out on a case-by-case basis by the ICC
will not necessarily serve to reduce economic discrimination. Cost
savings through high volume are more likely to arise from larger quanti-
ties per shipment than from additional shipments per time period. For
example, it is likely to cost the railroad less to carry fifty-two carloads
of a commodity in a single train than to carry one carload of that com-
modity per train once each week for fifty-two weeks. Thus, it would
probably be more consistent with a policy of discouraging economic
discrimination to permit single shipment volume discounts than to
permit volume discounts based on total shipments over a given time
period.8 2 But whether the differential in question arises from a single
79 It should be noted that since the utility was the only purchaser of coal at the
point of destination, the case was not truly one of personal discrimination (that
is, between shipments of like commodities between common terminals over a single
line), although the rates had initially been suspended on a § 2 theory.
80 311 I.C.C. 355 (1960). The quantity rate was available on all coal in excess of
3,000,000 tons to any one consignee, provided such consignee received not less than
5,500,000 tons during the designated fiscal year. Id. at 360.
81 The quantity rate was nominally available for all coal shipments to the area
but only electric utilities consumed sufficient coal to be eligible. Id. at 356.
82 The FTC has recognized this cost phenomenon in the sale of goods sector
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shipment or a multiple shipment volume rate, it is clear that the re-
quirement that the competition came from a nonregulated rather than
a regulated source has very little to do with the elimination of economic
discrimination.
A variation on the volume rate practice is the contract rate in which
a shipper receives a special rate in return for an agreement to ship a
designated portion of his total shipments over a given period with the
carrier granting the special low rate.8 3 The ICC, in recently disapproving
several proposed contract rates, has relied upon the "destructive com-
petitive practice" language of the National Transportation Policy with-
out going so far as to consider the discrimination provisions of sections
2 and 3.84 The ICC has, however, announced that contract rates are
"unlawful per se."8 5
While a contract rate need not favor large over small shippers, all
shippers being eligible for the discount if willing to commit themselves
to ship the designated percentage within the designated time period, such
of the economy by refusing to find cost justified quantity discounts based on yearly
volume of purchases. See note 61 supra.
83 In the unregulated sector such exclusive arrangements would give rise to anti-
trust problems under Section 3 of the Clayton Act and Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
as well as Robinson-Patman Act questions. See New York Cent. R.R. v. United States,
194 F. Supp. 947, 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
84 In Contract Rates on Rugs & Carpeting from Amsterdam, N.Y. to Chicago,
313 I.C.C. 247, aff'd sub nom. New York Cent. R.R. v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 947
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 368 U.S. 349 (1962), the ICC held unlawful as a
"destructive competitive practice" a proposed reduced rate for rugs conditioned on
the shipper's agreement to move eighty per cent of its annual volume of the traffic in
question over the carrier's line.
85 Guaranteed Rates, Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario to Chicago, 315 I.C.C. 311, 323 (1961).
While the ICC in holding unlawful the contract rates in Contract Rates on Rugs and
Carpeting, note 84 supra, emphasized that competition of competing railroads and
motor carriers would be affected, a more difficult case was presented in the Sault Ste.
Marie case for there it did not appear-at least in the view of the dissenting Com-
missioners-that any competing carriers, regulated or unregulated, were prepared
to offer competition to .the railroads proposing the contract rates with respect to the
shipments of pipe and tubing in question. Nevertheless, the Commission held that
adoption of the contract rates would have a destructive affect on the competition of
regulated water carriers. It is not clear whether the Commission was referring to im-
mediate competition of water carriers over the route in question, or only to the
potential competition of such water carriers or to the competition of water carriers
generally if such contract rates should be applied to other commodities over this and
other routes. Whatever the exact nature of the competition from regulated carriers
the Commission had in mind in its murky opinion, it was this competition that the
Commission felt distinguished the multi-shipment volume rates held lawful in
Coal from Ky., Va. & W. Va. to Virginia, and Coal to New York Harbor Area, where
there was no competition from regulated carriers. Thus, although the Commission
explicitly stated that contract rates are "unlawful per se," there is no definitive
holding concerning the validity of contract rates where engendered by competition from
unregulated carriers.
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rates may nevertheless lead to economic discrimination if the discount is
substantial. A railroad undoubtedly may be able to reduce certain costs
if it is able, through advance contracts, to estimate with increased
precision future shipments, but it is doubtful that a contract rate system
would give rise to sufficient cost savings to justify substantial contract
rate discounts. The ICC's refusal to approve contract rates thus probably
tends to discourage economic discrimination, even though the ICC
has not analyzed the contract rate problem as one of economic discrimi-
nation. But since the question whether a contract rate involves economic
discrimination presupposes a factual inquiry in which the differential
between the contract rate and the regular rate is compared with the
corresponding differential in costs, the ICC's "per se" prohibition is an
uncommonly blunt weapon against economic discrimination.
C. State Utilities Legislation
Quantity discounts are a nearly universal phenomenon in the pricing
of energy by electric utilities. The most common form of quantity dis-
count is the block schedule8 6 under which total quantities purchased
are divided into a series of blocks with the per-unit rate applicable to
total quantity purchased decreasing as one moves from the lower
quantity to the higher quantity blocks. 87
Public utility commissions not only permit block schedules but
actively encourage this form of differential pricing, at least so long as
the lowest rate exceeds the incremental costs to the utility of providing
the additional service. Such quantity discounts are thought desirable be-
cause they expand consumption of electricity by encouraging each
consumer of electric service to increase purchases.8 8 Commissions do not
86 See BARNES, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 338-39 (1942); CAY-
WOOD, ELEcrIC UTILrry RATE EcONoMIcs 43-47 (1956); TROXEL, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC
UTILrriEs 600-02 (1955).
87 A variation of the block schedule is the step rate schedule. In each type of
schedule, quantities consumed are classified into two or more blocks as zero to ten
kilowatt hours (kwh), ten to fifty kwh, etc. The difference is that in the block schedule,
a different per-unit rate is applied to purchases within each block whereas in the
step rate schedule the block into which total consumption for the period falls deter-
mines the per-unit rate for all units consumed. The step rate schedule has the
disadvantage that as one moves from one block to the next, a small increase in con-
sumption may result in a substantial decrease in the total charge. A curve describing
total cost as a function of consumption would show a series of "kinks" or "sawtooths."
For this reason, electric utilities have tended to abandon step rate schedules in favor
of block schedules. See CAYWOOD, op. cit. supra note 86, at 47-48; BARNES, op. cit. supra
note 86, at 336-38.
88 See, e.g., Re Rates and Rate Structures, 1931C P.U.R. 337-55 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1931); cf. Bilton Machine Tool Co. v. United Illuminating Co., 110 Conn. 417,
148 Atl. 337 (1930).
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seem to be troubled by the possibility of economic discrimination in-
herent in such discounts.8 9
While all block schedules probably involve a good deal of economic
discrimination, it should be noted that certain per-unit costs. do differ
with the quantity purchased. In analyzing utility costs, it is traditional
to differentiate among three kinds: output, customer and capacity
costs.90 Output costs are the costs of producing the energy itself, given the
requisite plant and equipment; such costs tend to vary almost directly
with the quantity provided to a customer. 9' Customer costs involve those
costs which do not vary substantially with the quantity purchased by a
given customer but which nonetheless vary with the number of customers.
Included are such items as periodic billing costs and the cost of installing
the equipment necessary to provide service to the customer's establish-
ment.92 Block schedules may reflect to a limited degree the higher per-
unit costs of serving low quantity customers rather than high quantity
customers which may be attributed to the existence of such customer
costs. But block schedules are very imprecise techniques for allocating
customer costs among units of energy.
The third type of cost-capacity costs-varies with the number of
customers and among customers but does not necessarily vary with the
quantity purchased.93 Because a utility is required to provide service
upon demand to all customers, it must have available at all times the
plant capacity necessary to provide that service. Thus, a customer who
consumes all purchased energy during one hour in the day which coin-
cides with the peak load for the system as a whole will cause the utility
to incur many times the capacity costs as will a customer who consumes
the same total quantity at a constant rate throughout the day. Since
capacity costs thus bear no necessary relationship to quantity purchased,
block schedules fail entirely to reflect these differential costs. In an
attempt to allocate such costs, many utilities have adopted, particularly
89 See Re Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 1928D P.U.R. 859, 861-62 (Mass. Dep't
Pub. Util. 1928). In considering block schedules, it should be borne in mind that
electric utilities and, to a lesser extent, gas utilities also classify consumers by the use
to which they put the product. Normal classifications include residential, commercial,
industrial, etc. and within each such classification a separate block schedule will be
constructed. Indeed, some commissions require classification if block schedules are
used so that residential consumers have an opportunity to buy additional units of
lower price blocks in the same manner as industrial consumers. See Public Util. Comm'n
v. Oquossoc Light & Power Co., 11 P.U.R. (n.s.) 25, 36-37 (Maine Pub. Util. Comm'n
1935).
90 See discussion of output, customer and demand cost in BANS, op. cit. supra note
86, at 525-31 (1942).
91 Id. at 331.
92 Ibid.
98 Id. at 325-26.
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for industrial customers, two-part rates; one part contains a block
schedule for energy consumed and the other part involves a special
charge for units of capacity required to stand ready to serve the customer
in question.94 While two-part rates may tend to reduce economic
discrimination, its success in doing so depends upon the accuracy with
which the capacity charge portion of the schedule reflects the incidence
of capacity costs.
Other devices which produce differential per-unit net charges with
varying quantities of service include minimum charges,9 5 which in effect
require the customer to purchase a minimum quantity during each
billing period, and lump sum service charges,9 6 which are added to each
bill whatever the quantity purchased.
While service charges and, to a lesser extent, minimum charges are
more convenient and less discriminatory methods for allocating customer
costs they have been less frequently approved by state commissions than
have block schedules. 97 The difference in treatment may probably be
attributed to the consumer resentment aroused by such charges which
seem, to the popular mind at least, to require the consumer to pay
something for nothing.98
IV. CLASSIFICATION OF CUSTOMERS AND USES
The second issue to be treated in comparative fashion under the three
statutory schemes is the extent to which a seller is permitted to group
his customers into classes, charging different classes different rates.
94 See BARNES, op. cit. supra note 86, at 339-43; TROXEL, op. cit. supra note 86, at
604-06; DAVIDSON, Price Discrimination in Selling Gas and Electricity in 72 STUDIES IN
HtsroucAL ANo POLrrICAL ScINcE 83-92 (1954).
I5 See BARNEs, op. cit. supra note 86, at 345; TRoxEL, op. cit. supra note 86, at 607.
96 See Re City of Oconto Falls, 14 P.U.R. (n.s.) 237, 240-41 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1936); BARNEs, op. cit. supra note 86, at 357; TROXEL, op. cit. supra note 86, at 606-08.
97 See Re Wisconsin Gas & Elec. Co., 9 P.U.R. (n.s.) 517, 520-21 (Wis. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1935); Re Wisconsin Michigan Power Co., 4 P.U.R. (n.s.) 276, 279-80 (Wis.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1934).
98 As the New York Public Service Commission explains, the "important fact" is
that "regardless of facts and figures, the consumer is apt to consider the service
charge ... as a charge for which the company renders no service or such small amount
as to be negligible. . . . In other words, the fundamental objection to the service
charge is not so much economic or accounting as it is psychological. Yet the effect upon
the consumer is most important and cannot be ignored in any determination." Re
Rates & Rate Structures of Corporations, 1931C P.U.R. 337, 347 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1931) (emphasis in opinion). This type of reasoning is carried even further
by some commissions by requiring minimum charges in preference to service charges.
See ibid; Re Public Serv. Co. 37 P.U.R.3d 485 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1961). A
number of utility commissions have prohibited per-room rates for residential con-
sumers particularly since large appliances have replaced lighting as the principle use
for residential energy. See, e.g., Re Wisconsin Michigan Power Co., 4 P.U.R. (n.s.) 27b,
279 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1934); Re Detroit Edison Co., 16 P.U.R. (n.s.) 9, 38-39
(Mich. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1936).
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A. Robinson-Patman Act
In analyzing the Robinson-Patman cases governing classification of
customers, it is important to distinguish between customers who purchase
for resale and those who purchase for consumption, and in the latter case
to distinguish between customers who are ultimate consumers and cus-
tomers who merely use the purchased goods in the production of other
goods.9 9 These distinctions arise because the degree of injury to com-
petition required to establish a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act is
much greater in the case of primary-line competition than in the case of
secondary-line competition. Secondary-line injury is most apt to occur
where the purchaser is a reseller because, under the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the act in Morton Salt, a substantial difference in prices
charged resellers will necessarily cause injury to the nonfavored reseller. 00
Where, however, the seller's goods are used in the production of other
goods, the price paid by the customer will normally constitute a much
smaller percentage of his per-unit costs. Thus, the impact of the dis-
crimination will be more problematical and indirect than in the resale
case, and presumably Morton Salt does not require a finding of com-
petitive injury merely from a showing of a substantial price dif-
ferential.1 1 In some situations, even a rank discrimination against a
manufacturer-customer cannot be shown to have affected the business
of the nonfavored purchaser. Finally, where the purchasers are ultimate
consumers there will be no competitive injury whatever within the
meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act.102
Thus, so long as competition is not injured at the primary line, a
seller may lawfully differentiate in price between (1) manufacturers
and resellers, 0 3 (2) manufacturers or resellers, on the one hand, and
ultimate consumers on the other,104 (3) resellers on different levels of
99 Classification of customers is, of course, permitted even if there is an injury to
competition provided the differential in prices is cost justified. But the standards for
allocating costs by class are high, particularly where the individual classes encompass
different types of purchasers. See United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962);
Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30, 42-43 (1953).
100 See discussion of Morton Salt in text accompanying notes 23-25, 58-60 supra.
See also Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43, 49 (8th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 411
(1958).
101 See Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir.
1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
102 Since ultimate consumers do not compete in sale either of the products in
question or of products made therefrom, there is no competition at the ultimate
consumer level to be injured. Cf. Yale and Towne Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1580 (1956).
103 See Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30, 36-37 (1953).
104 Informal opinions of the FTC, Biverage Syrup, 81 CONG. REc. 2339 (app. 1937);
Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949); Sano Petroleum
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the distribution chain, such as wholesalers and retailers, at least so long
as the differential favors distributor levels nearer the seller,10 5 (4) manu-
facturers not in competition with each other,10 6 (5) manufacturers in
competition with each other, so long as the seller's product does not
constitute the major element of cost for the manufacturers, 107 and (6)
ultimate consumers, however similarly situated. 108 One may conclude the
seller has very broad powers to classify customers, so long as he does not
make classifications among resellers. In the last two situations, it will
be noted, the Robinson-Patman Act permits differentials between cus-
tomers who, under any standard, must be said to be similarly situated.
Whatever may be said for the desirability of the foregoing distinctions,
they have nothing to do with economic discrimination. Quite to the
contrary, allowing differential prices to customers in noncompeting lines
of business permits the seller to vary prices according to the differing
elasticities of demand of the various classes of customers. In the act's
own rather perverse manner, it is only where the customers' elasticities of
demand are likely to be similar, as where they are both resellers on the
same level of the distribution chain, that the act provides strict prohibi-
tions against differentials based on classification.
Still another form of classification of customers may be legitimated by
the principle that a non-cost justified price differential is unlawful under
the act only where the goods sold to favored and nonfavored purchasers
are of "like grade and quality." While granting that some such test is
necessary to determine whether one or more products are involved, no
clear guidelines have been consistently applied. The cases may be read
to say that the act treats as of "like grade and quantity" substantially
Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Secatore's Inc. v. Esso
Standard Oil Co., 171 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1959).
105 The lower price given to the reseller nearer to the seller on the distribution
chain is called a functional discount. The lawfulness of such functional discounts is
well established, but an important limitation is that the level of resale, rather than
the level of initial sale, is decisive in determining the reseller's level on the distribu-
tion chain. See Mueller Co., No. 7514, FTC, Jan. 11, 1962; General Foods Corp., 52
F.T.C. 798, 824 (1956). It may be, however, that a reseller further from the seller may
not be given a discount, for in that case the nearer reseller would be injured. Thus,
a lower price to a retailer than to a wholesaler might injure competition. Compare
Krug v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956) with Sano Petroleum
Corp. v. American Oil Co. 187 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). See also FTC v. Morton
Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 55 (1948).
106 Cf. Yale and Towne Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1580 (1956). This principle would also
seem to follow a fortiori from the fifth principle in the text.
107 See note 102 supra.
108 Cf. Corn Products Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 739, 742 (1945); Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344
U.S. 206 (1952); see EoWARDs, THE PRIcE DISCRIMINATION LAw 234 (1959).
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identical goods sold under different brands and labels 0 9 and goods
which are physically highly similar where sold under identical brands
and labels," 0 but treats as not being of "like grade and quality" goods
with quite distinct physical characteristics when not sold under identical
brands and labels."'
B. Interstate Commerce Act
The Interstate Commerce Act purports to prohibit absolutely classifica-
tion of customers. Thus, a carrier may not charge two shippers different
prices for hauling a given commodity between two given points, and this
absolute prohibition applies whether or not the shippers are in com-
petition." 2 Such a differential in price is considered to constitute
personal discrimination and thus must pass muster under the strict
prohibitions of section 2.113
The foregoing general principle is somewhat misleading, however,
because a carrier which chooses to discriminate between customers may
usually, by one means or another, accomplish that objective lawfully.
For example, where shippers are engaged in shipping either from or to
different points, a rate differential becomes a geographical differential
to be tested under the more liberal proscriptions of section 3. More-
over, where shippers do not compete the carrier may be successful in
justifying a differential on the theory that the commodities carried are
not alike and thus the service sold to the shipper is different." 4 The
'109 American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, 187 F.2d 919, modified, 190 F.2d 73 (5th
Cir. 1951); Borden Co., No. 7129, FTC, November 28, 1962; Fruitvale Canning Co.,
52 F.T.C. 1504, 1506 (1956); Page Dairy Co., 50 F.T.C. 395 (1953); United States Rubber
Co., 46 F.T.C. 998, 1006-09 (1950); United States Rubber Co., 26 F.T.C. 303 (1938);
In re Golf Balls Mfr. Ass'n, 26 F.T.C. 824 (1938).
110 Cf. Atlanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958); General Foods
Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956).
111 For cases indicating that where different brands or labels are not used, physical
differences must be substantial to avoid a finding of like grade and quality, see Moog
Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43, 49-50 (8th Cir. 1956); American Can Co. v. Bruce's
Juices, 187 F.2d 919, modified, 190 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1951).
112 A leading case is ICC v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 225 U.S. 326 (1912), where the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that a railroad might justify charging -more for
the shipment, between the same points of origin and distance, of fuel coal than
commercial coal, even though the two kinds of coal did not compete, the fuel coal
being used by railroads and the commercial coal being used by other types of con-
sumers.
113 A price differential between shippers with respect to the same product or com-
modity between the same points also may be illegal under the looser prohibitions of
§ 3 but the crucial test arises under the stricter provisions of § 2. Section 3 becomes
crucial only where different points of destination or origin are involved, or because
different commodities are involved, § 2 is inapplicable.
114 The term "commodity" is used throughout this paper in a general sense to
refer to all forms of freight, including industrial products. Where the term is used
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geographic differential will be separately discussed in a succeeding section
of this paper, but the different service justification bears investigation at
this point.
Railroads have traditionally charged sharply different pound-mile rates
for different commodities. In general, the higher the value of the com-
modity, the higher the rate, although special costs associated with
particular commodities are also frequently reflected in the rates. The
resulting rate structures have become quite complex. Within any given
rate territory, rates are divided into class rates and commodity rates.
The number of class rates under the Uniform Freight Classification,
which is now applicable in most of the United States, totals fifteen with
rates varying from fifty-five per cent to four hundred per cent of an
arbitrarily selected "average" class rate. Every product subject to the
class rate classification is assigned a particular class. Some eighty-five per
cent of freight travels, however, under commodity rates which are in a
sense exceptions to the class rates. Each of the hundreds of commodities
subject to commodity rate, rather than class rate, treatment is assigned
an individual rate.115
The wide differences between various class and commodity rates are
not closely related to differences in cost, whether of incremental costs or
of the fully distributed variety.1  Moreover, it is apparent that the ICC
encourages departures from cost differences in determining class and
commodity rates. Under official Commission doctrine, two principles of
rate making flourish side by side-cost of service and value of service-
either of which principles may from time to time be used to support
given rate differentials. 117 Value of service has many meanings. It is
used, for example, to refer to the observable principle that high value
commodities will normally support a higher freight rate than low value
commodities. 118 The term is also used to refer to the maximum rate at
which traffic with respect to a given commodity will still move. In still
another sense, it reflects an equitable notion held by carriers and
in a special sense, as in the sense of "commodity rates" in contradistinction to class
rates, the context should make the special usage clear.
115 With respect to class and commodity rate classification, see LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS
OF TRANSPORTATION, 156-182 (5th ed. 1960).
116 See, e.g., United States Sugar Corp. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 277 I.C.C.
193, 202-03 (1950). See also BUREAU OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, INTER-
STATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, VALUE OF SERVICE IN RATE-MAKING 201-16 (1959).
117 Id. passim.
118 That the market price of a product may be a less than adequate measure of
"value" of the service involved in carrying that product cannot, of course, be denied.
See BONBRIGHT, PRINcIPLEs OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 378 n.18 (1961); LOCKLIN, op. Cit.
supra note 115, at 156-72. See also, All Commodities from New England to Chicago &
St. Louis, 315 I.C.C. 419 (1961).
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regulators that the burden of providing a transportation system ought
to be placed on those shippers most able to pay, whatever the costs of
handling their shipments. Whatever meaning may be assigned, a "value
of service" principle has traditionally been used by the ICC in approving
the practice of railroads of varying freight rates to reflect differences in
the elasticity of demand. Since the elasticity of demand tends to be
greater for high than for low value commodities, "value of service"
notions have been particularly useful to railroads in justifying pricing
of the most classically discriminatory character." 9
In the discussion of the definition of economic discrimination, 20 we
concluded that though a seller imposed a differential in prices unrelated
to the corresponding differential in incremental costs, we should not say
that the seller had engaged in price discrimination unless the same
product was involved in each case. In determining whether the railroads'
practice of classifying commodities should be considered economic discri-
mination, the question thus becomes whether the same product is in-
volved where a carrier provides transportation services with respect to
two different commodities. At least three general situations involving
commodity classification can be postulated. First, the commodities may
be sufficiently similar that the railroad is able to transport both com-
modities with the same basic equipment at substantially the same costs.
Second, the railroad may be able to transport both commodities with
the same basic equipment but the incremental cost of transport for
one is greater than for the other because of, for example, special han-
dling costs. Third, the commodities may require quite different equip-
ment, such as refrigerator cars for the one commodity and flat cars for the
other, and therefore presumably different costs.
In the first case postulated, it would be fatuous to argue that the
service provided is different for the one commodity than for the other.121
In the second case, the better view would seem to be that the service
provided is the same, that the additional incremental costs of carrying
119 The ICC has not only approved value of service rate-making by railroads but
has actively encouraged it by, for example, holding that rates for high value commodi-
ties are subject to special restrictions against reductions not applicable to low value
commodities. See, e.g., Alcoholic Liquors from N.H. & N.Y. to Tex. & La., 315 I.C.C. 124,
127 (1961); New York, N.H. & H. R.R. v. ICC, 199 F. Supp. 635 (D. Conn. 1961), af'd,
372 U.S. 744 (1962). But see All Commodities, New England to Chicago & St. Louis,
815 I.C.C. 419, 425 (1961), for a strong dissent revealing that not all members of the
Commission support value-of-service ratemaking.
120 See text at pp. 4-6 supra.
121 The clearest example of differential prices for identical transportation service
arises out of the growing practice of containerization. See statement of James E. Haydon
in Legal Problems in Containerization and Transportation Coordination, 28 ICC PRAc.
J. 185, 188 (1960).
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the one commodity should be reflected by a proportional difference in the
freight rates, and that any rate differential which is proportionately
greater or lesser than the cost differential would involve economic discri-
mination. The third case is arguable since in one sense different produc-
tion bases-that is to say, different kinds of equipment-are required to
carry the two commodities. On the other hand, by far the greatest
portions of the capital involved, the right of way, locomotives, terminals,
etc., will be the same for all commodities, and the special costs for
certain commodities-such as special cars-can be viewed as merely a
difference in incremental cost. Under this latter analysis, the dif-
ferential in costs of the special equipment should be reflected propor-
tionately, but no more than proportionately, in the rates for the two
commodities.
The ICC has not attempted, with limited exceptions, to use the
discrimination provisions of the act to discourage the economic discrimi-
nation inherent in value-of-service commodities classification. Quite the
contrary, it is only where the commodities in question have been con-
sidered sufficiently competitive so that competitive injury could occur
to disadvantaged shippers that the ICC has applied the relevant dis-
crimination provisions of section 3.122 Moreover, section 3 is a basis for
eliminating the differential only where the higher rate causes actual
competitive injury to the high rate shipper. 123 Yet even where the two
commodities compete and the rate differential causes injury, the
Commission has sometimes refused to order elimination of the differential
where the commodities differed significantly in value. In those situations
the Commission has explicitly relied on the principle that "value of
service" considerations are to be weighed in determining whether the
discrimination is "undue" under section 3.124
NAhile it is clear that "value of service" ratemaking often leads to rate
122 See the discussion of the role of competition in determining whether higher
valued commodities should bear a higher rate than lower valued commodities in
Cream of Wheat Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 91 I.C.C. 45 (1924); cf. Institute of
Scrap Iron & Steel, Inc. v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 316 I.C.C. 55, 66-67 (1962). Section 2
is not applicable since it applies only to differences in rates for the same commodity.
123 Thus, in Aluminum Co. of America v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 146 I.C.C. 363,
372 (1928), where a rate differential between aluminum on the one hand and tin
and copper on the other was in question, the Commission held: "We cannot conclude
that [undue prejudice and preference] exists merely because the rates are different and
there is some competition between the metals. There must be a further showing that
the difference in rates operated in some way to complainant's disadvantage in market-
ing aluminum." See also Arnovia-Buckingham Slate Co. v. Aberdeen & R. R.R., 174
I.C.C. 767 (1931); Staley Mfg. Co. v. Wabash Ry., 167 I.C.C. 12, 15 (1930).
124 See Wim. Wrigley Jr., Co. v. Aberdeen and R. R.R., 161 I.C.C. 41, 44 (1930);
Ogden Packing and Provision Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 101 I.C.C. 236, 252 (1925);
Coke Producers Ass'n v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 27 I.C.C. 125, 147 (1913).
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differentials exceeding differences in incremental costs, it is not unlikely
that in some cases the differential in rates between certain commodities
of roughly equal market value is substantially less than proportional
to the difference in incremental costs and hence also an example of
economic discrimination. To be sure, differences in "cost of service" are
recognized as a defense to a section 3 charge.' 25 But the ICC does not
appear to have challenged rates which are substantially identical for two
commodities despite substantial differences in "cost of service."
In defense of the ICC it must be recognized that the discrimination
provisions are not the only weapons it may use against discrimination.
For example, it has the power under sections 1 and 15 to hold either
the high or the low rate unreasonable and to prescribe new rates.126
But this power has been used to control inter-commodity differentials
only within the broadest limits. As in cases decided under the discrimina-
tion provisions, "value of service" constitutes one of the principal con-
siderations in determining the "reasonableness" of individual rates.1
27
In summary, while official ICC doctrine holds that classification of
customers is illegal per se, that principle applies only to transportation
of the same commodity between the same points of origin and destina-
tion. The fact of the matter is that the ICC encourages classification of
customers through classification of commodities, thereby making it pos-
sible for railroads to engage in classical textbook discrimination by
pricing in accordance with the elasticity of demand for transportation
services of each class of shippers, the value of the commodities serving
under "value of service" conceptions as a workable rule of thumb for
determining elasticity.' 28 One recent empirical study suggests that the
125 See, e.g., Robertson Co. v. Alabama Great So. R.R., 167 I.C.C. 693 (1930).
126 See discussion at p. 16 supra.
127 See BUREAU OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, INTERsTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION, VALUE OF SERvICE IN RATE-MAKING (1959).
128 The ICC has freely acknowledged that railroads classify commodities on other
than a cost-of-service basis and has suggested that the greater attention paid to cost-of-
service considerations in recent years in justifying classification schemes lies not in
a preference for cost-of-service over value-of-service ratemaking but rather in the
competition of other modes of transportation which has tended to make high rates
assigned in previous years too high to be competitive in the light of the new com-
petition. Thus, in Class Rate Investigation, 1939, the Commission described railroad
classification practices as follows: "Formerly, when the railroads had practically a
monopoly of transportation, the principle given the greatest consideration was
value of service, described as the ability to bear a particular rating with profit to the
shipper or manufacturer and the railroads. Less weight was accorded the cost of
service element. Development of competitive transportation agencies with flexible
service, and a disregard of the element of value by the competitive agencies in the
determination of their charges, have reacted upon the policies of the classification
committees with the result that generally weight density is now the dominant con-
sideration in determining classification ratings. This does not mean that value and
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degree of economic discrimination resulting from such value-of-service
ratemaking is quite substantial.12 9
C. State Utilities Legislation
Electric utilities classify customers and uses in a number of different
ways, principally by type of purchaser, by time of purchase and by type
of power.
In the first type of classification, electric utilities have traditionally
differentiated among the principal classes of power consumers, such
as industrial, commercial and residential purchasers. 130 Sometimes the
classification is carried much further, as between types of industrial
purchasers. 31  Utility commissions have favored such differentials,
usually without considering whether or not economic discrimination
is involved. 32 They have often approved special rates to new industrial
consumers to induce establishment of plants in the community. It
is only when the purchasers are so similarly situated that no rational
basis for distinction appears, 133 or where the rates to one class are not high
other principles of classification are completely eliminated from consideration; but it
does mean that the value of an article does not control the rating to the extent
it formerly did." 262 I.C.C. 447, 481-82 (1945). This analysis, far from demonstrating
that cost-of-service has become the controlling principle, suggests that value-of-service
remains the decisive principle because the railroads continue to attempt to maximize
profit with respect to each kind of traffic without reference to the respective costs of
carriage. The reduction of rates on certain classes of traffic in the face of competition
is simply that reduction which is necessary to maximize profits in the light of the
new competitive conditions.
129 "Value-of-service rate-making is a trade practice with an almost one-to-one cor-
respondence with the economic model of the discriminating monopolist." MEYER, THE
ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES 170 (1960). See id. at
170-74, for an analysis of the ICC-approved rate level increases, tending to show that
rates on high valued commodities are increased by a greater percentage than low
valued commodities. See also TRONE, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORT 662-64 (1955).
130 BARNES, THE EcoNoMIcS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 324, 384-35 (1942);
CAYWOOD, ELECTRIC UTILrrY RATE ECONOMICS 67-68 (1956).
131 "Special rates, even with only one customer being supplied thereunder, in
themselves have not been considered discriminating nor unusual by the Commission
in the past where the rates were designed to meet the peculiar demands of the
customers' business, equipment, or conditions. . . . Our tariff files are full of special
rates for one customer which this Commission seems to justify." Cavert Wire Co. v.
Pennsylvania Power Co., 51 P.U.R. (n.s.) 248, 253 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1943).
(Emphasis in original.)
132 E.g., Smith v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 351 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1961); Re
Wholesale Rates for Electric Power to Rural Cooperatives, 19 P.U.R. (n.s.) 22
(Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1937). Residential consumers are sometimes classified by the
number of rooms or of electric outlets in their houses, although this kind of classifica-
tion has become less frequent with the development of meters. See CAYWOOD, op. cit.
supra note 130, at 44. It is sometimes used, however, in determining the "demand"
charge in two-part rates. See also BARNES, op. cit. supra note 130, at 340-43.
133 One rather sophisticated commission has justified low rates for industrial
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enough to cover out-of-pocket costs and make a contribution to over-
head,134 that utility commissions have found the differential rates
to constitute discrimination under the applicable statutes. While it is
occasionally argued that service to industrial purchasers is less costly than
to residential purchasers, it is likely that the saving is only that which
might more appropriately be recognized by a quantity discount or by
a special off-peak discount where the industrial purchaser operates
at off-peak hours.
The second category of classification-by time of purchase-can be
traced to technological considerations. Because electricity cannot be
stored and the demand, varying from moment to moment, reaches a
"peak" once a day and because the electric company as a "public utility"
has a duty to serve all members of the public, its plant must be large
enough to serve that daily peak demand. 18 5 Because considerable excess
capacity is available most of the day many utilities have instituted, par-
ticularly with respect to industrial accounts, different rates for "peak"
and "off-peak" consumption.18 6 Economists have engaged in a good deal
of highly technical debate concerning whether, and under what circum-
stances, such differentials constitute economic discrimination. It seems
consumers on a "diversity factor" theory to the effect that peak-load capacity is
required per unit actually consumed to service industrial consumers. See Wisconsin
Pub. Serv. Corp., 7 P.U.R. (n.s.) 1 (1934).
134 Re Southern California Edison Co., 6 P.U.R. 3d 161, 206 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1954); Consumers v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 1926A P.U.R. 525 (Mass. Dep't
Pub. Util. 1925).
135 While railroads also tend to have peak-load problems, though with a seasonal
rather than a daily frequency (daily railroad peaks normally being limited to carriage
of commuting passengers), the railroads have not, to any substantial extent, offered
off-peak discount rates and therefore, the ICC's attitude toward such discounts has not
been defined. See NELSON, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 363 (1959);
Borts, Increasing Returns in the Railroad Industry, 42 J. POL. ECON. 816, 327-33
(1954). In the unregulated sector, seasonal peaks are also common, but at least with
respect to commodities (as opposed to services) to which the Robinson-Patman Act
is applicable, it is possible to solve the seasonal problem to a certain extent through
inventories. Though in one sense no discrimination exists with respect to off-season
discounts since all purchasers during the off-season purchase at the same time, the
Robinson-Patman Act permits discrimination between purchasers buying at different
times only to the extent justified by the "changing conditions" proviso to § 2(a) which
specifies that "nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes from time to time
wherein response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability
of the goods concerned, such as but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration
of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process,
or sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned." The
scope of the "obsolescence of' seasonal goods" clause remains to be defined. See
generally, RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 821-29
(1962).
136 CAYWOOD, Op. cit. supra note 130, at 68.
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generally agreed that because peak and off-peak power are joint
products in the sense that the off-peak power is an inevitable by-product
of producing power to meet peak demand, a lower price designed to dear
the off-peak supply does not necessarily involve economic discrimination.
One could either say that the products are different or that, since peak
load power must be produced whether or not off-peak power is sold the
bulk of costs should be allocated to peak load sales.' 37 Utility commissions
have not been bothered with such troublesome theoretical questions, how-
ever, and have generally supported such pricing. 38
Another consequence of the nonstorable quality of, and the fluctuating
demand for, electric power is the utilities' practice of classification by
types of power. In addition to sale of power at regular rates, electric
utilities also frequently sell at sharply lower rates, particularly to in-
dustrial purchasers, interruptible power (interruptible under certain
conditions),13 9 and, at still lower rates, dump power (interruptible with-
out condition). Commissions apparently favor such differentiation of
product.'40 This form of classification is not essentially different from
classification by time of purchase. Interruptible and dump power sales are
merely different instances of off-peak sales. The peak, rather than oc-
curring daily, occurs irregularly through the year. An important question
of fact may often be involved, however, because if power is never in fact
interrupted, the classification may be merely a technique for selling
at different rates to purchasers with different elasticities of demand.
V. GEOGRAPHICAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION
A. Robinson-Patman Act
Geographical pricing problems which have led to litigation under the
Robinson-Patman Act arise from two principal facts of business life.
The first is that incremental costs of sales to different purchasers tend to
increase with the distance of the purchaser from the point of production
because goods must be transported to purchasers. Thus, if prices do not
reflect these incremental freight costs, economic discrimination is in-
evitable. Further, if the FTC should consider the mill net return as the
137 See BONBRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 118, at 359-60; Hirshleifer, Peak Loads and
Efficient Pricing, 72 J. oF EcoN. 451, 457-62 (1958).
138 But see Re Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp., 7 P.U.R. (n.s.) I (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1934), for an exceptional commission attempt to analyze off-peak differential problems.
139 See BONBRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 118, at 335; CAYWOOD, op. cit. supra note 130,
at 70.
140 Cf. Wolf v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 77 S.W.2d 1091 (Tex. Ct. of Civ. App.
1935) (gas utility); Cock v. Marshall Gas Co., 226 S.W. 464 (Tex. Ct. of Civ. App. 1920)
(gas utility). But cf. Re New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 6 P.U.R. (n.s.) 113 (N.Y.
Dep't of Pub. Serv. 1934).
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"price" within the meaning of the "to discriminate in price" clause of
section 2(a), the quoting of geographically uniform delivered prices would
give rise to serious Robinson-Patman Act problems. The seller might
avoid this problem by quoting prices F.O.B. plant but here he would
run into the other horn of a legalistic dilemma. Prices which reflect dif-
ferential freight costs result in differential price quotations and, if the
actual price quotation is to be considered the "price" under section 2(a)
and if injury to competition can be demonstrated, result in a prima fade
case of price discrimination. The FTC, after a false start,14 1 came down on
the side of the actual price quotation rather than the mill-net return as
the relevant "price" for a prima facie case. 142 At first blush, that con-
dusion would appear to promote uniform delivered prices and hence
economic discrimination. 143 The FTC's response has been that price
differentials reflecting freight differentials may be justified by the seller
under the cost justification provisions of the act.
The second fact of business life leading to geographical price discrimi-
nation questions under the Robinson-Patman Act is that not all sellers
function in markets of similar geographic size. Thus, national sellers
frequently compete with regional and local sellers with the result that
any regional or local price reduction by national sellers may give rise
to a charge of predatory discrimination. The popular image of predatory
price-cutting is that a national seller, in competition in a local market
with small local sellers, reduces prices to drive local sellers out of busi-
ness. It is highly questionable whether such predatory price-cutting often
occurs. A national seller, though possessing a larger treasury, can only
afford to cut prices to drive local competitors out of business if his losses
will not be greater than the gains he will be able to derive from in-
creasing prices after competition is destroyed. Such predatory price-
141 See FTC and Supreme Court opinions in Cement Institute, 37 F.T.C. 87, 256-57
(1943), vacated, 157 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1946), reinstated, 333 U.S. 683, 722-25 (1948).
142 Chain Institute, Inc., 49 F.T.C. 1041, 1105 (1953); National Lead Co., 49 F.T.C.
791, 881-82 (1953), modified, 227 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd, 352 U.S. 419 (1957);
Clay Prod. Ass'n, 47 F.T.C. 1256, 1273 (1951). The FTC's Advisory Committee on Cost
Justification, reporting in 1956, expressed the rule as follows: "In all instances of
'geographic' or 'delivered' pricing the intent of the parties must be considered-what
they mean the price to be. If the arrangement is for the buyer to transport the goods,
or pay for the transport, the price obviously does not include freight charges (e.g., $1
per dozen f.o.b. seller's factory, no freight allowed). On the other hand, if it is
understood that the seller will transport the goods to the buyer or pay for the
transport (e.g., $1 per dozen f.o.b. buyer's plant, or 51 per dozen f.o.b. seller's plant, full
carload freight allowed). In each case (whether transportation is prepaid or allowed)
the price is $1 per dozen, i.e., there is no price differential. In finding price it is
reality that counts, not form; it is, for example, of no consequence that in one case
the seller pays the freight and in another the buyer pays it and deducts the amount
on payment of the invoice; either way freight is at seller's cost."
143 See A-r'Y. GEN. NAT'L Coatar. ANTrmUST REP. 216-17 (1955).
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cutting can therefore be practiced only if competition can be driven out
quickly so that losses will be minimized,144 and if entry by new com-
petitors or reentry by the same competitors can be sufficiently delayed
so that monopoly prices can be charged long enough to secure the
projected profits. However infrequent such predatory price-cutting, the
vital point is that it is this special form of price differential that the FTC
has sought to prove in most geographic differential cases. 145 The dif-
ferential between the reduced price in the local market and the un-
reduced price elsewhere is relied on to establish the "discrimination."
The crucial question thus becomes, assuming there is no possibility of
establishing a cost justification or meeting competition defense, whether
the requisite injury to competition can be established. Since the favored
and disfavored purchasers are by hypothesis not in competition (for
otherwise the predatory purpose could not be accomplished), the relevant
test of competitive injury thus becomes the primary-line criterion which
requires an injury to competition among sellers extending beyond mere
diversion of business from competing sellers.146 Indeed, most of the
cases dealing with primary-line injury have involved geographic dif-
ferentials. 147 In geographic discrimination cases, however, there is a
tendency to permit proof of predatory intent as a substitute for proof
of actual injury to competition at the primary level.148
144 See McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. LAW &
ECON. 137, 138-43 (1958).
145 The great Standard Oil case of 1911 is usually cited as an example of predatory
price-cutting. A careful review of the record, however, has failed to reveal substantial
evidentiary support for that conclusion. See id. at 168.
146 Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957); E.B. Muller & Co.
v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944); cf. Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 848 U.S.
115 (1954); Atlas Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950
(10th Cir. 1959); See also Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co.,
30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1929), decided under the predecessor statute. As the Director of
the FTC Bureau of Litigation has put the Commission's litigation policy: "The basic
theory underlying the intent of Congress in declaring 'area' price discriminations to be
violations of the law is generally that of preventing predatory use of market sub-
sidization. In other words, the law hits at the practice of throttling local competition
by lowering prices in one geographical area while maintaining higher prices in other
areas. It seeks to prevent a large seller, with an interstate treasury, from subsidizing
diminution or complete elimination of profits occasioned by discriminatory price
cuttings in one and, by maintaining-or perhaps raising-its normal profitable
pricing structure in other areas .... ." Remarks of Joseph E. Sheehy, quoted in
EnwARDs, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAw 452 (1959); see Anheuser Busch, Inc. v.
FTC, 289 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1961), on remand from FTC v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 363
U.S. 586 (1960); Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1955);
Purex Corp., Ltd., 51 F.T.C. 100 (1954); General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C., 885 (1954);
discussion at pp. 11-13 supra.
147 See Adelman, Geographical Price Differentials, 48 ILL. BAR ASS'N J. 514, 514-18, 519'
(1960).
148 One important aspect of the law governing geographic differentials is that the
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Where predatory price-cutting in the strict sense does not exist
and where the geographical price differential reflects only the difference
in the degree of competition in two markets (as where the national seller
faces more effective rivalry in one market than another), it is not
dear that the differential prices should be considered to be economic
discrimination. To resolve that question one must answer the definitional
question, posed in an earlier section, whether differential pricing arising
from differences in purchasers' tastes, should be considered to constitute
economic discrimination. 149
B. Interstate Commerce Act
Since geographical differentials involve different hauls and hence dis-
similar "circumstances and conditions," they need not comply with the
strict provisions of section 2. Rather, such differentials cases are tested
under the more liberal undue preference and prejudice test of section 3,
except in the limited situation where the two hauls occur over the same
line in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer,
where section 4 establishes a special rule. Unfortunately, we have no
authoritative statement of the elements of a section 3 offense where
shipments are made over different routes. Certainly the statutory language
requiring an "undue or unreasonable preference or advantage [or]
prejudice or disadvantage" helps very little. It is sometimes said that a
section 3 violation consists of rate relationships based on other than
"transportation" considerations (unless justified by competition).15 But
neither the ICC nor the reviewing courts have fashioned the "transporta-
Robinson-Patman Act treats the multi-plant firm as a single entity even though the
costs of the two or more production bases are sharply different. Thus, if an East Coast
plant sells at a lower price than a West Coast plant of the same firm and thereby
injures competition, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that the dif-
ferential is fully justified by differences in costs. The burden of cost justification tends
to be difficult for defendants to meet under any circumstances (see discussion at pp.
13-14 supra) and will be particularly difficult to meet where separate plants, and
perhaps even different accounting systems, are involved. Moreover, there is a substan-
tial question whether differences in manufacturing costs between two plants con-
stitute differences "resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered," such differences alone
being justifiable under the act.
149 See discussion at pp. 7-8 supra. The analogy to dumping is readily apparent.
fDoes a monopolist whose home market is protected by tariff barriers engage in
economic discrimination when he sells abroad in competition with local sellers at a
competitive price which is lower than the monopoly price charged at home? See gen-
erally VINER, DumrN'c: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1923).
150 See, e.g., Fargo Chamber of Commerce v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 306 I.C.C. 407, 412
(1959); BUPRAU OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION, VALUE OF SERVICE IN RATE-MAKING 132, 151 (1959); LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS
oF TRANSPORTATION 497 (5th ed. 1960).
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tion" concept into a useful tool.151 Mr. Justice Brandeis was hardly
helpful when he declared:
To bring a difference in rates within the prohibition of section
3, it must be shown that the discrimination practiced is unjust
when measured by the transportation standard. In other words,
the difference in rates cannot be held illegal, unless it is shown
that it is not justified by the cost of the respective services, by
their values, or by other transportation conditions.
15 2
By incorporating value of service notions Mr. Justice Brandeis was surely
suggesting that the revenues to be obtained at various levels of potential
rates was a factor to be considered, an approach which, as we have seen,
tends to encourage economic discrimination. 15 3
Despite such broad pronouncements, the ICC has tended to restrict
itself to various rough measures of the comparative cost of the respective
services in determining whether geographical rate relationships violate
section 3. Sometimes cost studies of one form or another have been
prepared. 154 But since the costs of differing hauls are difficult to isolate,
the ICC has often been forced to rely on respective distances as a rough
measure of differential costs.155 In the process of comparing distances
certain other factors such as topographical conditions'5 6 and traffic
151 See, e.g., the confusing discussion of the cases in BuREAu OF TRANSPORT
ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, op. cit. supra note 150, at 132-53.
252 United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 263 U.S. 515, 524 (1924). (Emphasis added.)
153 See statement of ICC policy toward value-of-service rate-making in regulation of
inter-commodity differentials, pp. 33-34 supra.
154 Where the distances to the allegedly prejudiced point differ from the distance
to the allegedly preferred point, the failure of costs to increase proportionately with
distance adds a complicating dimension to the inquiry. Because of loading, unloading
and similar costs which must be incurred for each haul but which do not vary with
the length of the haul, the ICC has recognized a "tapering" principle under which,
transportation conditions being otherwise similar for two hauls, the shorter haul
should demand a rate which, on a per-mile basis, exceeds the rate on the longer haul.
Cf. Mayo Shell Corp. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 297 I.C.C. 133 (1955). See also TROXrEL,
EcoNouIcs OF TRANSPORT 671-72 (1955).
i5 Fargo Chamber of Commerce v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 306 I.C.C. 407 (1959);
Buckeye Sugars v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 302 I.C.C. 351 (1957); Mayo Shell Corp. v.
Baltimore & 0. R.R., 297 I.C.C. 133 (1955); New Orleans Traffic & Transp. Bureau v.
Aberdeen & R. R.R., 296 I.C.C. 59 (1955). See discussion of comparison of distances in
State Corp. Comm'n v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 646 (D. Kan. 1954). See SHARMAN,
Tim INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION pt. III, vol. B, pp. 541-42, 567-69 (1936). But
the ICC has held that the "mere showing that there are lower rates in effect to a
more distant point does not in and of itself prove that the rate assailed was or is
unreasonable or unduly prejudiced." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry.,
270 I.C.C. 789, 790 (1948). See also Commodity Credit Corp. v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 306
I.C.C. 525, 533 (1959).
156 See, e.g., Cedar Hill Coal & Coke Co. v. Colorado & So. Ry., 16 I.C.C. 387, 391
(1909); cf. Railroad Comm'n v. Missouri & N.A. R.R., 30 I.C.C. 488, 489 (1914).
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densityI 57 have occasionally been taken into account in arriving at a
judgment whether the differences in rates fail to reflect differences in
the costs of service.
Aside from the cost-of-service standard, certain other elements of a
section 3 violation are well established. Section 3 is not violated unless
shippers in favored localities compete with shippers in disfavored
localities' 5 s and actual injury is sustained either in the form of injury
to particular disfavored shippers 59 or to the general economy of the dis-
favored locality.160
In its regulation of discrimination among localities, the ICC has in
general pursued policies more consistent with elimination of economic
discrimination than has the FTC. Thus, the ICC has recognized that
identical rates may be discriminatory if costs differ and that a shipper
charged a rate which is lower than that charged a second shipper may
be discriminated against if costs are more than proportionately lower on
the low rate haul.'6 '
157 Traffic density, while doubtless having a direct impact on per-mile costs of
transporting a given commodity is, nevertheless, a troublesome standard because
greater density on the preferred haul may itself be the consequence of the rate prefer-
ence. See Baltimore Chamber of Commerce v. Ann Arbor R.R., 159 I.C.C. 691, 705-06
(1929); cf. Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce v. Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry., 60 I.C.C.
67, 75 (1920). See also SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION Pt. III, vol.
B, p. 570 (1933).
158 See Western Carolina Shippers' Ass'n v. Ashville So. Ry., 174 I.C.C. 353, 358
(1931); Kistler Leather Co. v. Pittsburg S. & No. R.R., 169 I.C.C. 247, 252 (1930).
159 See City of Moorhead v. Great No. Ry., 172 I.C.C. 38, 43 (1931); Federated Metals
Corp. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 161 I.C.C. 287 (1930); United States Phosphoric Prod. Corp.
v. Butte, A. & P. Ry., 153 I.C.C. 459, 465 (1929). The extent of injury, it has recently
been indicated, need be no more than a reduction in the disfavored shipper's profit
margin. Mayo Shell Corp. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 297 I.C.C. 133, 135 (1955); Mayo
Shell Corp. v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 296 I.C.C. 507 (1955); cf. Anchor Coal Co. v. United
States, 25 F.2d 462 (S.D.W. Va. 1928). Injuries to competing modes of carriage (primary-
line injury in Robinson-Patman lexicon) are usually treated under the minimum rate
power of § 15 rather than under the discrimination provisions of § 3. See discussion
at notes 42-43 supra.
160 See New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 309, 310-32 (1947). "The great dis-
crimination cases of the twentieth century have been really pitched battles between the
Manufacturers' Associations or Chambers of Commerce of competing localities, some-
times widely separated geographically, but inextricably linked economically." Comment,
40 YALE L.J. 600, 602-03 (1931).
161 Rich Ladder & Mfg. Co. v. Akron, C. & Y. Ry., 241 I.C.C. 475, 482 (1940); North-
em Potato Traffic Ass'n v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 178 I.C.C. 237, 245-47 (1931). See also
Texas and Pac. Ry. v. United States, 289 U.S. 627, 655 (dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice
Stone). But see Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F.2d 462, 471 (S.D.W. Va. 1928). The
cases cited do not, however, prove that the ICC is fully cognizant of the nature of
economic discrimination. In each case the lower gross rate, found to be a discrimination
in favor of the shipper paying it, was really the lower rate on a per-mile basis. What one
would want to find, to be certain that the ICC grasped the notion of economic dis-
crimination, is a case in which a lower per-mile rate was found to be a discrimination
[Vol. 31.1
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
In one very important class of cases, the group rate cases, the ICC
has not only failed to construe section 3 in a manner designed to reduce
economic discrimination, but has given it strong support. In general,
railroad freight rates for any commodity tend, on a per-mile basis, to
decrease as distance increases from any given point of origin or destina-
tion. However, in certain parts of the country with respect to certain
commodities, railroads have adopted the practice of grouping points of
destination so that the aggregate rate to the further point is the same as
to the nearer point. Points of origin have also frequently been grouped
in the same way. It cannot be gainsaid that some decrease in per-mile
rates with increase in distance is consistent with nondiscriminatory prices
because of the tendency, particularly in view of costs of loading and un-
loading which are common to any haul, of the incremental costs of hauls
to decrease on a per-mile basis with increases in distance.162 No part of
the difference in costs between the shorter and the longer hauls is re-
flected, however, in group rates, and therefore, where a single carrier
serves two grouped points, economic discrimination is inevitable. Doubt-
less, a good deal of the economic discrimination resulting from group
rates may be considered de minimis on the grounds that administrative
convenience requires grouping of closely located points; certainly it
would be a physically impossible task to quote rates from every point
of origin to every point of destination in the country. To put the ad-
ministrative convenience point somewhat differently, the costs of quoting
different rates to every different point within small geographical areas
would exceed the differentials in the aggregate of other costs of providing
service to those points. Nevertheless, the points frequently grouped cover
such an extensive geographic area that the grouping cannot possibly be
justified on grounds of administrative convenience. For example, for
shipments of certain commodities from points on the Pacific Coast, the
entire area east of the Missouri River, and in some cases east of Denver,
constitutes a single destination group.163
Grouping of rates has been defended by the railroads and viewed b
in favor of the shipper paying it. In the absence of such a case, it may well be that the
ICC has shown no more sophistication than the FTC under the Robinson-Patman Act
for the FTC also uses the per-unit price rather than the gross price in passing on
charges of discrimination.
162 This principle has been recognized by the Commission from the beginning. See
Williams Co. v. Vicksburg S. & P. Ry., 16 I.C.C. 482, 487 (1909); New Orleans, Cotton
Exch. v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. R.R., 2 I.C.C. 289, 293 (1888).
103 See Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Merchant Marine
Study and Investigation, S. REP. No. 2494, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1950); LOCKLIN,
EcoNOMIcS OF TRANSPORTATION 201 (4th ed. 1954). Oranges delivered to the New York
market are subject to the same total transportation charge whether the point of origin
is Florida or California.
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the ICC as a technique for promoting competition by permitting, for
example, distant shippers to compete with shippers located nearer to
buyers. 164 Despite frequent protestations that a discrimination may not be
justified on the grounds that it offsets the geographical advantages of
more favorably situated points of origin or destination,165 the ICC has
given little attention to the possibility that grouping, by depriving better
located sellers of their economic advantage of proximity to buyers, may
tend to encourage the expansion of resources committed to transport
services, thereby causing misallocation of resources in the economy. Under
the ICC's approach an origin group, for example, becomes too large
only where the group is large relative to the length of the haul and the
nearer shippers are seriously injured by competition from more distant
shippers. 166 This standard of injury required for a violation appears to
be much higher than that applicable to rate relationships other than
group rates.167
The ICC's favorable attitude toward grouping of rates reaches far
beyond mere permissiveness. It is reluctant to disband established groups
where the more distant enterprises have developed in reliance on group
rates.168 And it has on occasion required the expansion of groups over
carrier opposition. 16 9
164 See A. C. Dutton Lumber Corp. v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 151 I.C.C. 391,
412 (1929); cf. Galloway Coal Co. v. Alabama Great So. R.R., 40 I.C.C. 311, 320 (1916).
The creating-competition principle has also been applied by the Commission to justify
destination groups. See Eastern Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 299
I.C.C. 691, 715-16 (1957). The ICC has argued that grouping of origin points is peculiarly
appropriate for natural resource shipments. Chicago Gravel Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry., 118 I.C.C. 633, 645 (1926); Wisconsin & Arkansas Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, I.M. &
S. Ry., 33 I.C.C. 33, 36-38 (1915). On the ICC's attitude toward group rates, see generally
SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMISSION pt. III, vol. B, pp. 670-91 (1936);
Comment, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 204 (1949). It must be recognized that the regulatory
system itself sometimes leads to grouping of rates. Where a carrier faces competition
on a long haul but not at intermediate points, § 4, by prohibiting charging more for
the short than the long haul, tends to require the carrier to place both the intermediate
and the distant points in a single destination group. The carrier may, of course,
dssert the competition at the distant point as a ground for relief by the Commission
from § 4. See discussion accompanying notes 190-198 infra.
165 See Stuttgart Rice Mill Co. v. Alabama & V. Ry., 93 I.C.C. 517, 530 (1924); Pacific
Lumber Co. v. Northwestern Pac. R.R., 51 I.C.C. 738, 742 (1918); Eau Claire Board of
Trade v. Chicago, M. & St.P. R.R., 4 I.C.C. 65, 77 (1892); cf. Washington Potato & Onion
Shippers Ass'n v. Union Pac. R.R., 300 I.C.C. 537, 555 (1957); Consolidated Mining &
Smelting Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 299 I.C.C. 231, 244 (1956).
166 National Petroleum Ass'n v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 126 I.C.C. 11, 16 (1927); Chicago
Gravel Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 118 I.C.C. 633, 645-46 (1926).
167 See discussion of group rate cases in SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION pt. III, vol. B, pp. 674-91 (1936); Comment, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 204-09
(1949).
168 See Bituminous Coal to C.F.A. Territory, 46 I.C.C. 66, 143 (1917); Kansas City
Transp. Bureau v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 16 I.C.C. 195, 203 (1909); cf. Federated
Metals Corp. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 161 I.C.C. 287, 288 (1930).
169 See Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Director Gen., 78 I.C.C. 549 (1923). See also
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C. State Utilities Legislation
Geographical economic discrimination in the case of electric and gas
utilities may occur in one of two ways. Two purchasers located in dif-
ferent areas but served by the same utility may be charged differential
rates which bear no relation to differences in cost, or, as is much more
often the case, two geographically separated purchasers may be charged
the same amount despite different costs of service. In general, the more
distant the purchaser from the source of power, the greater the cost of
providing the power to the purchaser. These differences primarily
represent varying costs of delivery. Such cost differences may be aug-
mented, or offset, by other distribution costs arising from relatively great
or relatively low density of purchasers. The resulting uniformity is similar
to uniform delivered prices in the sale of goods. While this uniformity
lends itself to economic discrimination, it must be recognized that the
billing costs involved in attempting to charge each customer with his
precise share of the costs of delivery of the electricity might be so great
as to outweigh any economic advantages to customers which might be
associated with elimination of discrimination. 170 In this sense, uniformity
of electric rates may, to a certain extent, reflect the same administrative
convenience consideration which may be found in group railroad rates.' 7 '
Public utility commissions have generally failed to take such cost
factors into account and have favored system-wide uniformity of rates.172
Where commissions have sought to give some recognition to differences
in the cost of delivery, they have usually limited their efforts to creating
two or more broad rate zones.' 73 A common device is the creation of an
United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 263 U.S. 515 (1924). In addition to the economic
discrimination involved in group rates, one recent empirical study suggests that on
the whole "short-haul traffic does not make the same contribution to overhead as
long-haul traffic." This relationship is attributed to the "higher elasticity of demand
for short-haul railroad traffic . . . created by truck competition." MEYER, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF CoMPtETrION IN THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES 175 (1960).
170 BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 296-97 (1961).
171 See discussion in text at pp. 45-46 supra.
172 See Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 28 P.U.R.3d 355 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959);
Metropolitan Edison Co., 13 P.U.R.3d 29, 83-84 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1956); Rates
& Rate Structures of Corporations Supplying Electricity in New York City, 1931C
P.U.R. 337, 343 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1931); Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 1928E P.U.R.
634 (Kan. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1928); Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 1928D P.U.R. 859,
862-63 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1928); Baird, Should the Rate Making Unit be Fixed
by Statute, I U. CHI. L. REv. 451, 458 (1934); cf. Capitol Transit Co. v. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 213 F.2d 176, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Potomac Elec. Power Co., 28 P.U.R.3d
206, 223 (D.C. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1959). But cf. Wabash Valley Elec. Co. v. Young, 287
U.S. 488 (1933). Two sets of uniform rates, one for urban areas and one for rural areas,
are common. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co., 3 P.U.R. (n.s.) 355, 360-61 (Ala. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1933).
173 See Welch, CASES ON PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 507-08 (1961). See also Warren
1963]
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
urban and a rural zone.' 7 4 Rarely is there any systematic attempt to
calculate the actual costs of delivery to individual purchasers or even
to specific geographical areas.'7 5
VI. THE ROLE OF COMPETITION
In the above discussion concerning the nature of economic discrimina-
tion, the question was raised whether that concept should be defined to
include differential prices traceable to differences in the competitive
situation between markets.'7 6 The agencies administering the regulatory
schemes under consideration here have not dealt directly with that ques-
tion. They have, however, to one degree or another, taken competition
into consideration either in the definition of the proscribed conduct or
in the specification of affirmative defenses.
A. Robinson-Patman Act
The Robinson-Patman Act permits a seller to justify a price dif-
ferential "by showing that his lower price . . . to any purchaser or
purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor."'177 It is questionable to what extent this meeting competition
defense actually serves to ameliorate the rigidifying effects on the
distribution system of the act's proscription of price differentials. The
circumstances under which a price reduction, however competitively
motivated, may qualify for the meeting competition defense are quite
limited. The fundamental qualification to the defense is that the seller
may only meet, not beat, the equally low price of a competitor. This
v. Wisconsin Rapids, 45 P.U.R. (n.s.) 383 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1942). For a dis-
cussion of the Southern California Edison Company's six zone system, see Southern
California Edison Co., 6 P.U.R.3d 161, 190-97 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1954). It is true
that where utility systems cover very large areas, some state public utility commissions
establish utility districts within the state. Each district will then be a separate unit
for ratemaking purposes. But the districts are relevant only for rate level regulation,
the total revenues for each district being limited to a certain percentage of the rate
base in that district. Districting is not normally an attempt to adjust rates to reflect
differing costs of delivery.
174 See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 26 P.U.R.3d 129, 142-44 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1958); Missouri Edison Co., 22 P.U.R.3d 427 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1958); Missouri
Power & Light Co., 10 P.U.R. (n.s.) 8 (1935).
175 Utility Commissions may, however, require rates to reflect special taxes imposed
by municipalities occupying less than the total sales territory. Cf. Village of Maywood
v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 23 11. 2d 447, 178 N.E.2d 345 (1961); City of Elmhurst v.
Western Gas Co., 363 Ill. 144, 1 N.E.2d 489 (1936); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 40
P.U.R.3d 209, 215-17 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1961). Discrimination problems may
arise from the generation by a single utility system of power in two or more geo-
graphically separated plants with varying cost characteristics.
176 See discussion at p. 8 supra.
177 Robinson-Patman Act, § 2(b), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958).
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rule has several complicating applications. The seller may only reduce
prices to his competitor's level and may not undercut that level, 78 or
in any event may not do so intentionally.179 In determining whether a
competitor's price has been undercut, it is necessary to take into account
not only the seller's low price but also the quality of his goods; if the
seller has a premium product and the competitor has not, an equal price
may be deemed a price which does more than merely meet competition.
Since "premium" in this sense may refer merely to greater public ac-
ceptance-as, for example, that accorded a nationally advertised product
-and not to any inherent superiority in quality, it will often be im-
possible for a seller to predict with certainty whether a court would treat
a given price reduction as only meeting the competitor's price or as
undercutting it.180
Moreover, some courts have treated price reductions for the purpose
of attracting new customers, as opposed to retaining old customers, as
outside the scope of the meeting competition defense.' 8 ' The general
principle suggested in dicta by the Supreme Court that the price met
must be lawful 8 2 has been applied to impose a burden upon the seller to
show that the circumstances were such that a reasonable seller should
reasonably have believed the competitor's lower price to be lawful.'8 3
Further, the reduction in price must be made in response to a specific low
price of a competitor within the context of rivalry for a specific customer
and not as part of a pricing system.' 8 4 Finally, it is only a competitive
178 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 242, 247 (1951); Atlas Bldg. Prod. Co. v.
Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 957 (10th Cir. 1959).
179 Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 155 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1946). See also Balian Ice
Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 366 (9th Cir. 1955); ATr'y. GEN. NAT'L
Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 183 (1955).
180 In Gerber Products Co. v. Beach-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916, 922
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), the "ultimate test" was stated to be "whether a substantial part of the
public is prepared to pay a greater price" for the seller's than for the competitor's
product. See also Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957), vacated, 265 F.2d 677 (7th
Cir. 1959), remanded, 363 U.S. 536 (1960), on remand, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961);
Pure Oil Co., No. 6640, FTC, Sept. 28, 1962; American Oil Co., No. 8183, FTC, June 27,
1962.
181 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249-50 (1951); Standard Motor Prod.,
Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1959); ef. J.A. Folger Co., No. 8094, FTC, Sept. 18,
1962. But see Sunshine Biscuit, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962), setting aside
FTC order, No. 7708, FTC, Sept. 28, 1961.
182 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951); FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324
U.S. 746 (1945).
183 American Oil Co., No. 8183, FTC, June 27, 1962; Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n, Nos.
7225, 7496, FTC, May 10, 1962. See also Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54 (5th
Cir. 1956); Doubleday & Co., 52 F.T.C. 169, 199 (1955).
184 See Standard Motor Prod., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir. 1959); E.
Edelmann & Co., 51 F.T.C. 978 (1955), aff'd, 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956). On the re-
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offer to the seller's customer, and not a competitive offer to that
customer's customer, which will support a meeting competition defense,
even though the seller's failure to lower his price must necessarily result
in loss of the first customer's business. 185
The cumulative effect of these many restrictions on the meeting com-
petition defense is that the FTC has not yet sustained a single defense
after commencement of formal proceedings. 186 The few cases where
defendants have successfully invoked this defense involved the setting
aside by reviewing courts of FTC orders.
87
B. Interstate Commerce Act
In considering the role of competition as a defense under the
Interstate Commerce Act, several distinctions must be kept in mind. One
distinction involves the geographical source of the competition. Thus,
competition may come from carriers serving the same points of origin and
destination as the defendant railroad; such competition may be called
carrier competition. 8 8 On the other hand, the competition may be
provided by carriers serving a common point of destination but a dif-
ferent point of origin (or, less frequently, a common point of origin and
a different point of destination). This second kind of competition is
sometimes called "market competition" to emphasize that in one sense
rival producing areas are competing for the trade of a common consuming
center (or rival consuming centers for the production of a common
producing center). But use of that term should not be permitted to
obscure the fact that the focus of the competition is between carriers
which, through lowering of rates, attempt to stimulate increased traffic
over their respective lines. Another fundamental distinction is among the
types of carriers providing the competition. Thus, depending on the
context, the availability of a meeting competition defense may turn on
whether the rival carrier is another railroad or some other mode of
carriage and whether, in the latter case, the rival carrier is under the
regulation of the ICC. Finally, the availability of competition as a defense
will differ with the type of discrimination charged.
Where the charge is one of personal discrimination-that is, where the
lated point that the seller must have had actual knowledge of a competitor's lower
offer to the buyers in question, see Forster Mfg. Co., No. 7207, FTC, Jan. 3, 1963.
185 FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
186 See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 YALE L.J. 75, 102-03 (1961);
Rowe, Expectation Versus Accomplishment Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 1936-
1960, 17 ABA SEcTiON ON ANTrrusr LAw 298, 306 (1960).
187 E.g., FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1958).
188 It is also called "competition of routes." See LOCKLIN, ECONOMIcs OF TRANSPORTA-
TION 183 (5th ed. 1960).
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defendant carrier is alleged to have charged different rates for the
carriage of a single commodity between common points of origin and
destination-the general principle is that no meeting competition
defense will be recognized. Section 2, which governs such cases, contains
no explicit meeting competition defense and decisions interpreting that
section have established that competition is not a factor to be considered
in determining whether a "like kind of traffic" is carried under "sub-
stantially similar circumstances and conditions."18 9 As has been
observed, the ICC has nevertheless comparatively recently permitted rail
carriers to grant single shipment volume discounts where necessary to
meet the competition of another mode of carriage, and multiple ship-
ment volume discounts where necessary to meet competition from modes
not subject to ICC regulation (subject in each case to certain other
requirements previously discussed' 90). No distinction is made between
carrier and market competition. It is the combination of the greater
volume and the competition, rather than the competition itself, which
is deemed to create the requisite dissimilarity.
Where the alleged discrimination is between hauls-that is, where two
hauls of a like commodity have different points of origin or destination-
the general principle is that such a geographical differential may be
justified by a showing that the differential was essential to meet com-
petition of another rail carrier or another mode of transportation. 191 No
explicit distinction is made between carrier and market competition,
although the ICC appears to be somewhat more receptive to defenses
based on carrier than on market competition. This right to meet com-
petition is qualified, however, in a number of important respects. First,
meeting competition is not a defense to a differential if the competition
in question is present at both the favored and disfavored points, and
this is so even though there is a substantial difference in degree in the com-
petition at the two points.192 Second, where competition is presented
at some, but not all points of origin (or destination), the competition
must be met wherever presented or not met at all. 193 Thus, the meeting
189 Seaboard A.L. Ry. v. United States, 254 U.S. 57 (1920); Wight v. United States,
67 U.S. 512 (1897).
190 See discussion at pp. 23-25 supra.
191 See, e.g., Cotton Linters from Tex. to La. &- Tex. Ports, 237 I.C.C. 425, 430-31
(1940); Canned Goods from Savannah to Ga., 237 I.C.C. 175, 180 (1940).
192 See, e.g., Iron and Steel to Iowa, Minn., Mich., & Wis., 297 I.C.C. 363, 388-89
(1955).
193 See Iron & Steel to Iowa, Minn., Mich. 9- Wis., 297 I.C.C. 363, 388 (1955); Meats
& Packing House Products from Chicago to C.F.A. Territory, 237 I.C.C. 525, 541 (1940);
Cotton Piece Goods in the South, 234 I.C.C. 525, 534 (1939); Princeton Mining Co. v.
Algers, W. & W. Ry., 205 I.C.C. 737, 739 (1934); Memphis Freight Bureau v. Louisville
Ry. & Nay. Co., 194 I.C.C. 269, 272 (1933); Bunker Hill & Sullivan Co. v. Oregon-
Washington R.R. & Nay. Co., 132 I.C.C. 266, 271 (1927).
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competition defense under the Interstate Commerce Act does not make
legitimate the isolated, sporadic reductions which the FTC considers to
be the only reductions appropriate for absolution under the meeting
competition defense, but rather only systematic reductions applicable
uniformly to all points where competition is encountered. 194 Finally, the
ICC has sometimes been unwilling to permit a reduction to meet com-
petition where the effect would be to upset long established parity of
rates from competing points of origin or other well established rate
relationships.195
Two different kinds of competition may serve as a defense to a charge
of violation of section 4, the Long-and-Short-Haul clause. Competition
from another rail carrier will usually lead to charging more for a short
than for a long haul under the circumstances specified in section 4 only
where the defendant railroad has a more circuitous route than the com-
peting railroad. 96 Prior to 1957 circuity was one of the major circum-
stances permitting the ICC to grant relief from section 4 and in that year
section 4 was amended to permit rail carriers "operating over a line or
route" to "meet the charges of ... carriers of the same type operating
over a more direct line or route" without seeking approval by the Com-
mission.197
Where the competition stems from some circumstance other than
circuity, application must be made to the ICC for relief from section 4.
Most applications for approval cite the competition of water or motor
carriers and here the standards are much the same as those governing
competition as a defense under section 3. Thus, proof of injury
and proof that competition was met at all points presented are re-
quired.198 Market competition is, however, only infrequently a basis for
section 4 relief because, whether one is concerned with the competition
of origin or destination areas, localities at intermediate points on the
applicant's line will usually need a rate not lower than the locality at
194 See discussion at p. 50 supra. Moreover, the ICC allows the meeting of potential,
rather than presently existing competition. See Ethylene Glycol from Tex. to the East,
288 I.C.C. 785, 789 (1953); Petroleum Haulers v. Boston & Me. R.R., 269 I.C.C. 6, 9
(1947); cf. Alcohol from Ill. & Ind. to Texas City, Tex., 273 I.C.C. 555, 561 (1949).
195 See Meats from Oklahoma City, Okla. to Ark., Mo. & Tenn., 238 I.C.C. 625
(1940). See also Petroleum Products from Wyo. to Mont., 276 I.C.C. 721 (1950).
196 See the discussion of the geography of circuity in LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF TRANS-
PORTATION 470-72 (5th ed. 1960). Of course, competition from another rail carrier may
lead to § 4 problems where both railroads are of equal length and, while serving
the same end points, do not secure the same intermediate points. Here competition
with respect to rates between the end points will drive rates below those from an end
point to the intermediate points. See id. at 468-70.
197 71 Stat. 292 (1957).
198 See generally SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION pt. III, vol. B,
pp. 572-625 (1936).
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the end of that line in order to compete with localities located on a rival
line.190
A meeting competition defense is also available with respect to charges
of discrimination among commodities. Though two commodities are
sufficiently closely related that a differential in rates would be unlawful,
or so that the Commission would prescribe a fixed differential, the
existence of competition from competing carriers with respect to one
but not the other commodity will justify an otherwise unlawful dif-
ferential.20o
Whatever the context in which a meeting competition defense may be
advanced, the power of rail carriers to reduce rates in order to meet com-
petition is subject to several overriding statutory policies imported from
parts of the act not dealing directly with discrimination. Thus, without
regard to the extent of competition, the low rate must not be reduced
below a "just and reasonable" level prescribed by section 1, which
means in general that the reduced rate must remain compensatory.2 01
More particularly, where the competition comes from a different mode of
transportation which is subject to ICC regulation, such as from a water
or motor carrier, the right to meet such competition is circumscribed by
the ICC's power to prescribe minimum rates to preserve the "inherent
advantages" of competing modes of transportation. 202
109 See discussion of cases in LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION 479, 517 (5th
ed. 1960); Comment, 45 YALE L.J. 1426, 1452-55 (1936).
200 See, e.g., Fertilizer from Baltimore to Various Eastern States, 238 I.C.C. 563, 567
(1940); Meats & Packing House Products from Chicago to C.F.A. Territory, 237 I.C.C.
525, 537 (1940); National Veneer &- Panel Mfrs. Ass'n v. Aberdeen R.R., 195 I.C.C. 411
(1933); Atlas Cereal Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 89 I.C.C. 212, 218 (1924).
201 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
202 See notes 42-43 supra. The meeting competition decisions of the ICC highlight
a particular dilemma to be faced in stating ICC policy toward competition as a de-
fense. In view of the many applicable distinctions, which appear to be somewhat
more complex than those applied under the Robinson-Patman Act, one might expect
that the decisions of the ICC would have provided relatively precise guidelines con-
cerning the conditions under which competition will justify differentials under § 3.
But unfortunately opinions, particularly the more recent ones, do not illuminate. To
the extent that rules are stated, they tend to be stated so generally that one cannot
be confident that they provide a guide for the future. Thus, ICC pronouncements on
competition frequently create a grey area in which competition may or may not be
approved, depending apparently on the ipse dixit of the Commission. Thus, the Com-
mission has said, "It is fundamental, of course, that carriers may reduce their rates
to meet competition, provided the reductions are not below a minimum reasonable
level and they do not create undue preference or prejudice." Iron and Steel to Iowa,
Minn., Mich. : Wis., 297 I.C.C. 363, 388 (1955). Thus, we are in effect told, rate dif-
ferential designed to meet competition shall not be deemed to create undue preference
or prejudice under § 3 unless they create undue preference or prejudice, a hardly
helpful formulation. See REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
(LANDIs REPORT) 39 (1960) ("Opinions of the Interstate Commerce Commission are
presently in the poorest category of all administrative agencies. Their source is un-
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C. State Utilities Legislation
The prohibitions against discrimination in state public utilities
statutes do not, strictly speaking, admit of a meeting competition defense.
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the commissions which
enforce such legislation have been hostile to rate differentials designed
to meet competition.
Any discussion of competition in the electric power field must
recognize that competition among electric power companies is, as we
have seen,20 3 relatively rare. Whether this absence of competition stems
from economies of scale or from licensing policies of state utilities com-
missions, it nonetheless profoundly affects the role of competition as a
defense to a discrimination charge.
Electric power companies face a great deal of competition, however,
from other sources of energy, such as oil, natural gas, bottled gas and
coal, and, in the case of sales to industrial consumers, from private
electric power generation facilities.204 The only major fields generally
free from such competition are residential and commercial lighting.
State utility commissions permit construction of schedules designed to
give the utilities a rate advantage over such competing forms of energy.
For example, low rates to large industrial customers capable of con-
structing private power plants are favored even though rates to
residential customers are higher; the resulting differentials are not
required to be cost justified. Block schedules are approved which impose
high rates on residential consumers to the extent of estimated lighting
requirements-a demand for which the electric power companies have
a monopoly-but sharply reduced rates for additional residential
demands, such as cooking and heating, for which the electric power com-
panies face sharp competition. 205 Utility commissions frequently favor,
for example, sharply reduced "promotional rates" designed to induce
residential consumers to use electric power for new purposes. Special
rate meters attached to the appliance involved in the competitive use
(such as electric water heaters, electric furnaces and so forth) may
permit the utility to meet the competition charges of alternative forms
known and the practice has grown up of parsimony in discussing the applicable law
in making a determination. Lengthy recitals of the contentions of the various parties
are made as a prelude to a succinct conclusion devoid of real rationalization."). Cf.
Hector, Problems of the CAB and The Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE
L.J. 931, 942-43, 947-48 (1960).
203 See discussion in text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
204 Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 1928D P.U.R. 859, 862 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Util.
1928); Southern California Edison Co., 38 P.U.R. (n.s.) 116 (Cal. R.R. Comm'n 1941).
205 Cf. Alabama Power Co., 3 P.U.R. (n.s.) 355, 360-64 (Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1933).
See also CAYWOOD, ELEccc UTILrrY RATE ECONoMics 44 (1956).
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of energy with more precision than block schedules; this technique as-
sures that the benefit of the low rate will be secured by the consumer only
for the competitive use and not for noncompetitive uses, albeit the addi-
tional meters impose an additional cost of service.20 6
Thus, while the statutes do not specify that meeting of competition
should be a defense to a charge of discrimination, rates designed to meet
such competition are treated as nondiscriminatory.207
VII. SOME COMPARISONS IN METHOD AND PURPOSE
Review of three specific practices--quantity discounts, classification of
customers and geographical differentials-and of rules concerning meet-
ing competition reveals several sharp differences in the impact of the
regulation, particularly when the respective agencies' interpretation and
method of enforcement of the statutes are taken into account. Thus,
with respect to quantity discounts, state public utility commissions give
such discounts rather enthusiastic approval; the FTC permits them only
where their basis in differential costs can be demonstrated with precise
cost data; and the ICC prohibits them unless, in the case of single
shipment, multiple carload discounts, the differentials are "reasonably
related," and the lower rates help railroads to compete with other
transportation modes or,) in the case of multiple shipment volume
discounts, they help railroads compete with modes of transportation not
subject to ICC regulation. Again with respect to classification of cus-
tomers, state public utility commissions tend to favor broad classifications
of customers, the FTC tends to permit classifications where competition
between sellers is not seriously deranged unless such classification might
injure particular resellers in the chain of distribution, and the ICC,
while purporting to proscribe such classifications, encourages them in
fact through the device of classification of commodities and thereby
encourages economic discrimination. Turning to geographic differentials,
state public utility commissions have tended, with limited exceptions,
to discourage such differentials even where a policy of eliminating
economic discrimination would require rate differentials in view of
differences in costs of delivery; the FTC has not been greatly concerned
with such differentials except where it suspected that a large national
seller was trying to drive local competitors out of business; and the ICC,
while purportedly greatly concerned with eliminating discrimination
200 Cf. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 6 P.U.R. (n.s.) 113 (N.Y. Dep't of Pub.
Serv. 1934).
207 See Southern California Edison Co., 38 P.U.R. (n.s.) 116 (Cal. R.R. Comm'n 1941)
(competition from private generation); Modesto Irrigation Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 1932B P.U.R. 203 (Cal. R.R. Comm'n 1931) (geographical differential).
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arising from geographic differentials, has in many cases tended to approve
economic discrimination through group rate practices.
A review of these differences of approach reveals several common
policies of the agencies. First, the agencies strongly favor the status quo
in industry organization; they have sought to preserve the position of
existing firms, however economically unjustified, even to the point of
requiring economic discrimination to preserve them. In the case of the
FTC, the concern has been primarily for resellers and for local sellers
faced with national competition. In the case of the ICC and state utility
commissions, the concern has been more for the promotion of the firms
under regulation, except in the case of the ICC, to the extent that its
regulation extends to competitors of the rail carriers. Second, with
respect to the agencies regulating specific industries-and particularly
the ICC-a desire to engage in a form of economic planning, and not
merely to act as an enforcement agency for rules established by the
legislature, has been particularly strong. Finally, these latter agencies
have tended to favor the interests of the firms being regulated at the
expense of competing firms not subject to their jurisdiction. Thus,
the ICC permits volume discounts only where necessary to meet non-
regulated competition and the state public utility commissions have
encouraged economic discrimination by electric power companies where
necessary to meet the competition of alternative forms of power.
The methods and purposes of administration of the three statutory
schemes under discussion merit closer examination.
A. Robinson-Patman Act
The FTC has been primarily concerned with preserving the existing
distribution system. In furtherance of that objective the FTC has tended
to give the Robinson-Patman Act an "equal opportunity" interpretation.
The Robinson-Patman Act has been construed to give manufacturers
considerable latitude in differential pricing except where they quote
different prices to competing resellers, such as wholesalers or retailers.
While it has permitted functional discounts, such discounts tending to
preserve rather than to disturb the existing distribution system, it has
scrupulously insisted that the purchaser's function be determined by
the level at which he resells rather than by the functions he performs in
buying, thereby protecting existing wholesalers and retailers from com-
petition by more efficient integrated wholesaler-retailers which have ap-
peared more recently on the marketing scene. That the FTC should have
chosen to preserve the existing distribution system at the expense of
eliminating discrimination is not surprising when one reviews the legisla-
tive history of the Robinson-Patman Act. The initial impetus came from
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the United States Wholesale Grocers' Association at a time when the
position of wholesale grocers was being threatened by the growth of
chain grocery stores which combined retail and wholesale functions.
Strong support followed from retail grocers, retail druggists and food
brokers, who also were being challenged by more efficient marketing
methods.2 08
In regulation of geographical price differentials where the purchasers
are not in competition, the FTC has restricted its enforcement activities
to situations where local sellers face strong competition from a national
seller. Here again the motif of FTC policy appears to be an "equal op-
portunity" notion under which the local sellers' position is to be
protected against what is viewed as the unfair pricing practices of the
national firm.
In no aspects of its enforcement activities reviewed here, either with
respect to the three pricing practices reviewed or in its treatment of the
meeting competition defense, has the FTC shown any notable degree of
understanding of the phenomenon of economic discrimination.
B. Interstate Commerce Act
Systematic economic discrimination by railroads was well developed at
the commencement of ICC regulation in 1887. The Commission's energy,
as far as discrimination is concerned, has been largely directed at personal
and geographical differentials with relatively little interest demonstrated
in discrimination among commodities, although the incidence of economic
discrimination is probably far greater in the last area than in the other
two. The energy directed at personal and geographical differentials has
largely missed the mark, if economic discrimination is the phenomenon
to be regulated. While some economic discrimination has been eliminated
in cases of personal differentials, the terms of section 2 have also been
applied to require economic discrimination in the case of cost savings
from quantity shipments. The Commission, as we have seen, originally
required uniform rates even in the absence of uniform costs. To the
extent that the stringency of the quantity discount rules has been broken
down since 1939, the liberalizing influence cannot be attributed to
rising sensitivity on the part of the Commission to the nature of economic
discrimination but rather, with respect to single shipment quantity
discounts, to greatly increased truck and barge competition tending to
weaken seriously the economic health of the railroads and, in the
208 The legislative history is reviewed at length in ROWE, PRICE DISCRIsnNATIoN
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATNIAN ACr 11-23 (1962). See also PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO
THE RoBINSON-PATMAN ACT 196-202 (1963), for Representative Patman's list of the
"Supporters of the Act."
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case of multiple shipment volume discounts, to the competitive pressures
of nonregulated competition.
The history of the rules on quantity differentials reveals an interesting
conflict of values. Until 1939 the ICC was content to apply section 2
where necessary to secure equal opportunities for small shippers as
against large shippers. The carload-LCL differential was viewed as a
relatively harmless restriction on equal opportunity for shippers because
most small shippers were able to ship at least one carload at a time. But
the rise of competition from competing modes began to produce a
serious conflict in ICC policies, for the Commission also viewed its job
as one of promoting railroad traffic, and the inability to quote multiple
carload discounts threatened the railroads with loss of traffic. But as
trucks and barges were also put under ICC jurisdiction, the conflict in
policies became more complicated because now the Commission was also
dedicated to the goal of promoting truck and barge traffic. The Na-
tional Transportation Policy suggests the dimensions of the conflict.
Among the congeries of policies to be. furthered, the ICC is to "foster
sound economic policies in transportation and among the several car-
riers," while "preserv[ing] the inherent advantages of each" of the
modes, "all to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a
national transportation system by water, highway, and rail." Thus, equal
opportunities for small shippers are to be subordinated to promotion of
railroad traffic in the face of competition, but, to balance the need to
promote rail traffic against the simultaneous need to promote truck and
barge traffic, multiple shipment volume discounts are to be limited to
situations where the competition comes from modes not subject to ICC
regulation.
In the rules governing geographical differentials, we have seen the
same preference for preserving equal opportunities for shippers over
eliminating economic discrimination. Here grouping of rates has been
approved and even encouraged, in part on the theory that the distant
shipper should be able to compete on equal terms with the closer ship-
pers whether or not economic efficiency would thereby be improved. 0 9
209 Geographical discrimination may also be approved by the ICC in an effort to be
fair to all carriers: "[Geographically] price discrimination originates in large part from
efforts to allow each railroad to share in the available traffic. Thus, a carrier indirectly
connecting such terminals as San Francisco and Chicago may be permitted, by a group-
ing of rates or a long-haul-short-haul exemption, to set special rates in order to
compete with carriers directly serving these points, even though these rates are un-
related to the cost differences between serving this traffic and the carriers' other traffic.
From the viewpoint of the individual carrier, these special rates may be profitable
since they exceed the marginal costs of the additional traffic .... But for transporta-
tion systems as a whole such price discrimination may simply increase the excess
capacity and thus the costs of the other railroads serving the city pairs directly. Since
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To what can we attribute the ICC's lack of interest in discrimination
among commodities? The ICC has so freely condoned such economic
discrimination that there is evidence that the degree of discrimination is
increasing with the passage of time.210 It has sought to construct an in-
tellectual defense for such discrimination through its espousal of the
value-of-service doctrine. No single reason can be advanced, however,
to explain the Commission's encouragement of value-of-service discrimi-
nation. The system was in effect at the creation of the ICC in 1887, and
the fledgling agency probably found it easier not to attempt to change
existing patterns in view of the profound effects such change might have
on the economic fortunes of localities and industries throughout the
country.211 Second, while cost information with respect to particular rates
is of dubious reliability today, it was almost nonexistent in the days when
the ICC was forming its basic policies. To utilize the statutory provi-
sions to eliminate economic discrimination thus posed difficult practical
problems.212 Third, value-of-service arguably served an overriding na-
tional interest in the early years of the Commission when traffic for west-
ward expanding railroads could be created in the remaining undeveloped
areas of the United States by very low rates for agricultural and mineral
shipments while rates were maintained at a much higher level relative
to costs for the products of Eastern manufacturers. To prohibit such
discrimination among commodities might have been to slow the economic
development of the West.21 3 Here the desire to promote railroad
traffic merged in the patriotic desire to promote the westward growth
of the nation.
None of those three reasons excuses, or even explains, the ICC's con-
tinued encouragement of value-of-service discrimination. Perhaps they do,
however, reveal a regulatory syndrome that has persisted. The urge to
play the planner is strong in regulatory agencies, suffused as they are
it obviously costs more to haul traffic on the longer routes, the result is to increase the
total costs of the transportation industries." MEYER, op. cit. supra note 169, at 182-83.
210 The evidence is summarized id. at 180-81.
211 See Evans v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 1 I.C.C. 641, 646 (1887); 1 ICC ANN. REP.
10, 19, 40 (1887). See also SHARuF MAN, op. cit. supra note 198, at 414-16.
212 "The cost of the transportation of any one article of commerce over the line
of a public railway can never be arrived at with anything like accuracy.. . Should the
attempt be made to make [an] apportionment as between the various kinds of freight
carried, the elements of uncertainty that would necessarily be dealt with would increase
and multiply at every step. If the carrier desired to make the cost of any particular
traffic appear large or appear small, it would not be difficult to swell it or to lessen it
by such figures as would appear perhaps equally plausible in each case, but which,
nevertheless, would not be such in either case as ought to determine the rights of
third persons." Haddock v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 3 I.C.C. 302, 311 (1890).
218 See MEYER, op. cit. supra note 169, at 179.
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with the spirit of their own expertise.214 The ICC believes that value-of-
service ratemaking serves the interests of the economy. Its reasons, while
not very well thought out and while lacking in understanding of the
economics of price discrimination, are nonetheless plausible to the casual
observer. If rates on manufacturers were not high, so sayeth the Com-
mission, traffic in low-valued commodities such as coal could not move
under the higher rates which would then be necessary. Thus, the desire to
promote railroad traffic has led the ICC to encourage railroads to engage
in economic discrimination on a grand scale.
C. State Public Utilities Legislation
State utility commissions have not been notably sensitive to discrimi-
natory practices by electric power companies. Differential charging is
viewed as desirable, except to customers who are indisputably in like
situations, and as consistent with the commissions' "promotional" inter-
pretation of the regulatory legislation. Indeed, the commissions have stim-
ulated a good deal of economic discrimination by encouraging quantity
discounts and classification of customers and by permitting uniform sys-
tem-wide rates within each rate classification. Approval of the latter type
of discrimination may be laid partly to considerations of rate quoting
convenience and partly to a misconception of the nature of economic
discrimination, but in the case of quantity discounts and customer classi-
fication, a few of the more perspicacious commissions appear to recognize
that they are promoting economic discrimination.
Since the opinions of utility commissions do not, with rare exceptions,
discuss the reasons underlying decisions or make any attempt to build
an articulated body of legal doctrine, it is a highly speculative endeavor
to seek the reasons for this favoritism toward economic discrimination.
Several factors may be suggested. Electric power companies are usually
monopolies in the sense that only one electric power company is per-
mitted to serve a given area. They are, moreover, firms which are thought
to operate with marginal costs which decline sharply with increases in
output. Without attempting to verify that assumption, or to discuss the
circumstances under which the reasoning is likely to be correct, one can
214 This urge is dearly reflected in some of its decisions on the reasonableness of
individual rates, e.g., Wool & Mohair Rates, 276 I.C.C. 259 (1949) (economic condition
of sheep business to be considered in setting wool and mohair rates); Peaches from
the South to Official Territory, 270 I.C.C. 573, 582 (1948) (reduced rates for peaches
necessary to provide relief to peach industry); Alden Coal Co. v. Cent. R.R., 263 I.C.C.
639, 655-56, 656-57 (1945) (economic health of anthracite coal industry should be con-
sidered in determining rates for anthracite coal); American Potash & Chem. Corp.
v. Aberdeen & R. R.R., 258 I.C.C. 743, 757 (1944) (rates on fertilizer should be kept low
to stimulate agricultural production). See also Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25
F.2d 462 (S.D.W. Va. 1928).
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merely observe that the commissions appear to draw the conclusion that
by lowering rates in order to lure business away from competing forms of
energy or by creating new uses for electric power, the increased output
will tend to make possible lower rates for all purchasers and not merely
for the favored purchasers. 215 Such is indeed a possible result.216 But
whether it is the usual result of discrimination arising from quantity
discounts and classification of consumers is an empirical problem beyond
the scope of this paper.
Several other factors might be noted. If it is conventional to treat elec-
tric power companies as monopolies, it is nonetheless misleading. Such
firms face substantial competition from other forms of energy-natural
gas, bottled gas, oil and coal-as well as from industrial generating plants
and, occasionally, from municipal and federal power systems and other
private electric power companies.217 Only natural gas is customarily
regulated by the state commissions with jurisdiction over electric power.
The commissions, in attempting to promote consumption of electric
power, may tend to favor the electric power companies at the expense of
nonregulated competitors (or competitors regulated by other agencies).
For example, lower rates to industrial than to residential consumers may
merely reflect a desire to meet competition from alternative forms of
energy and from private generating plants; such competition is felt more
strongly in the case of industrial sales than residential sales. Further,
certain quantity discounts may reflect an attempt to take business away
from competing forms of energy. Thus, certain utilities have recently
added additional low rate blocks to their block schedule in order to
encourage home owners to switch to electricity for heating purposes.
These observations lead to rather melancholy conclusions concerning
the present status and future possibilities of statutes regulating price
discrimination. The agencies involved do not appear to comprehend the
nature of the economic phenomenon purportedly being regulated. In
many instances the regulation tends to promote economic discrimination:
The statutory schemes tend to be construed as equal opportunity or
promotional statutes and are administered either to protect existing firms
or to grant sellers an informal license to practice economic discrimina-
tion.
One is forced to conclude that whatever arguments may be advanced
215 See Wholesale Rates for Electric Power to Rural Cooperatives, 19 P.U.R. (n.s.)
22, 29-30 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1937).
216 See BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITy RATEs 309 (1961).
217 See CAYWOOD, ELEcrRIC UTILITY RATE EcoNomics 5 (1956).
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in support of anti-discrimination legislation, one cannot say that an
economic objective is served. The economic practice supposedly under
regulation is not discouraged and may indeed on balance be encouraged.
Legislation so long on the books is not to be condemned, of course, merely
because the only supporting considerations involve abstract social and
political values. One would have to undertake a searching inquiry into
the notion of equality in a market economy in order to be satisfied that
such legislation was unjustified. In the meantime, the social and political
values the statutes purport to embody may deserve to be taken seriously,
if only on the practical ground that it is precisely the strength of these
values which has enabled anti-discrimination statutes to survive massive
criticism. Barring a great change in the popular notion of economic
equality, perhaps the most that can be hoped is that regulatory agencies
will come to understand better the nature of economic discrimination.
These agencies have a wide range of discretion to reorient the administra-
tion of anti-discrimination legislation in order to attack more directly the
practice of economic discrimination.
